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SECURITIES FUNDING OF LONG-TERM CARE:
A STEP TOWARD A PRIVATE SECTOR
SOLUTION
Dana Shilling*
It is a truth universally acknowledged that a person in possession of
a good fortune who needs long-term care is likely to end up in want.'
I. Introduction
Improvements in medicine and public health have lengthened the
average lifespan of Americans, and greatly increased the percentage of
the population over age 65, especially the "old old" who have reached
the age of 85 or older.' Nonetheless, it has not been possible to elimi-
nate disease and debility. Although not every person over 65 suffers
from physical or mental impairment, or will develop a disabling con-
dition before death, many senior citizens have at least one illness or
limiting condition, or need assistance with one or more Activities of
Daily Living ("ADLs") such as eating, dressing, and bathing.3 As the
year 2000 approaches, the financing of nursing home care will pose an
increasingly complex problem, mandating public and private sector
cooperation.
Long-term care ("LTC") represents an enormous industry. It com-
prises acute medical care, chronic care, rehabilitation services, sup-
port services, and social services for the elderly and disabled.4
* A.B. Goucher College, 1972; J.D. Harvard Law School 1975; co-author of AGING
AND THE LAW, Commerce Clearing House (1990) and its 1992 Supplement with Peter J.
Strauss and Robert Wolf. The author is currently engaged in organizing a not-for-profit
organization for interdisciplinary research regarding private sector funding alternatives
for long-term care.
1. This sentiment is reminiscent of the opening line of a well-known English novel.
See JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE I (Donald J. Gray ed., W.W. Norman & Co.,
Inc. 1966) (1813).
2. Employee Benefits Research Institute, Issues Concerning the Financing and Deliv-
ery of Long-Term Care, ISSUE BRIEF 86, at 3-4 (January 1989) [hereinafter EBRI].
("The elderly, those aged 85 and older in particular, are the fastest growing age group in
the U.S. population.. Over the next 23 years-before the baby-boom generation begins
to enter the ranks of the elderly-the number of persons aged 65 or older is projected to
increase 1.7 percent per year, while the population aged 85 and older is projected to
increase at more than twice that rate, 4.1 percent per year."). See also UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY: ISSUES OF
NEED, ACCESS, AND COST, GAO/HRD-89-4, at 8 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter GAO I].
3. GAO I, supra note 2, at 2-4.
4. Id. at 8.
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Although most people think of nursing homes when they think about
providers of LTC, a high volume of services are also performed in the
elderly person's home and are known as home care or home and com-
munity-based services.5 Not surprisingly, in 1988, estimates placed
expenditures on LTC at $57.8 billion, with $44.3 billion allocated to
nursing home care.6 Unfortunately, however, these expenditures fell
well short of the LTC demand, suggesting that an expansion of LTC
services may be necessary to alleviate the difficulties elderly people
currently face in their lives.
The problem, on both an individual and a societal level, is that LTC
is very expensive. For example, the yearly cost of a nursing home stay
in 1988 averaged about $25,000 a year.7 Costs in some East and West
coast urban areas, particularly those offering a high staff-to-patient
ratio, often exceeded $75,000 a year and in some cases, exceeded
$100,000 a year. Home care can be equally expensive, or even more
costly, than institutionalization in a nursing home because it may be
necessary to hire three shifts of unskilled workers as well as retaining
the occasional services of several health care professionals.
Clearly, few families can make such large payments out of current
income. In many cases, the family's accumulated assets and the next
generation's expected inheritance can be decimated by the cost of
long-term health care. Although private LTC insurance is now begin-
ning to play a significant role in financing long-term care, the thesis of
this Article is that such LTC insurance is unlikely to become a major
financing source because it lacks long-range viability as a product.8
In response to this health care crisis, this Article proposes a new
system of funding long-term care that contemplates the issuing of se-
curities. This mechanism is designed to supplement or supplant pri-
5. Id. at 3. These services are often provided on an unpaid basis by friends and
family members.
6. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY CHOICES FOR LONG-TERM CARE
(June 1991) (report requested by the House Committee on the Budget) summarized at
Commerce Clearing House (CCH) Medicare/Medicaid Guide ("MMG") 39,479. The
Congressional Budget Office further estimated that private individuals paid $27.5 billion
for LTC in 1988 ($21.5 billion for nursing home care, nearly all of it paid out of pocket
rather than reimbursed by private health insurance, and $6 billion for home care, again
primarily paid out of pocket). The federal government financed $18.3 billion, $13.3 bil-
lion for nursing homes, and $5 billion for home care. Medicare paid for about half the
federal share of home care, but very little of the nursing home cost; Medicaid assumed
almost the entire federal participation in nursing home care. States contributed a further
$9.5 billion to the overall cost of nursing home care, almost entirely through the state
share of Medicaid costs; states also paid $2.6 billion for home care, and $1.1 billion in
Medicaid cost-sharing, $1.5 billion for other programs.
7. GAO I, supra note 2, at 4.
8. See discussion infra part II.C. 1.
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vate insurance and to enable the private sector to play a more
significant role. Part Two of this Article considers the current fund-
ing alternatives for nursing home care, and specifically explores the
types of facilities already in existence to serve the elderly in need of
nursing home services. The limitations of Medicare and Medicaid,
and the private sector funding alternatives for persons entering nurs-
ing homes are also discussed. Part Three introduces the concept of a
health care consortium and outlines how such a program could be
implemented. Part Four considers various legal implications of the
plan including the consortium's tax status, antitrust ramifications,
and problems that might arise in connection with Certificate of Need
("CON") laws.9
In the final analysis, the question is not whether one funding mech-
anism should supplant all others, but rather, whether consumers have
adequate choice of funding mechanisms that in turn will permit them
to obtain affordable high quality care. This Article contends that ex-
isting funding mechanisms are not sufficient, and should be supple-
mented with the securities plan. It further argues that the proposed
plan represents a positive solution to the existing system because it
contains no element of compulsion, expands competition and free
choice, and promotes equity by permitting individuals to pay for their
own care, leaving Medicaid funds available to those with fewer re-
sources and lower incomes.
II. The Current Health Care System
A. The Nursing Home Universe
In order to succeed, the proposed plan must appeal both to health
care providers and consumers. To predict the needs and predilections
of both groups, certain information is required. The size of the senior
citizen population; the degree of disability and need for care of the
population; and the types of facilities already in existence would all be
relevant factors in the plan's implementation.
1. Defining The Nursing Home Population
In 1990, more than 12 percent of the U.S. population, over 30 mil-
lion people, were aged 65 or older."° Predictions estimate that there
will be more than 64.5 million Americans over 65 years old in 2030.11
9. The implications arising out of state Certificate of Need issues will be important
in any proposal that involves the construction of nursing homes. See discussion infra part
Iv.C.
10. See EBRI, supra note 2, at 4, Table 1.
11. Id.
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In conjunction with this growth, demand for nursing home care is
likely to increase, particularly since the population of the "old old,"
those over 85, is increasing faster than the percentage of all elderly
individuals over 65.12 Although only about one percent of the overall
U.S. population, and five percent of the population of senior citizens,
are institutionalized, more than eighteen percent of the over-85 popu-
lation lived in institutions in 1985.13 In fact, it has been estimated
that there is at least one equally disabled person residing in the com-
munity for each nursing home resident, suggesting there is a vast un-
met need for nursing home beds.14 Collectively, the statistics show
that the proportion of the population that is most in need of nursing
home care is increasing the fastest, indicating that more nursing home
beds will be needed in the future.
Counting people who are actually in nursing homes and analyzing
their characteristics is reasonably simple. A more challenging task
involves predicting the risk of institutionalization for a group or a
particular individual. Even if it were possible to predict the age to
which a particular person would live, issues such as his or her state of
health and risk calculation factors such as finances, availability of un-
compensated care from family and friends, and availability of beds
complicate risk assessment. Recognizing the difficulty of making such
calculations, various studies have defined risk of institutionalization
figures at some point in a senior citizen's life as ranging anywhere
from 39% to 63%."' In addition, uncertainty over the correct defini-
tion of the term "nursing home" makes it difficult to reconcile statis-
tics from different sources. A distinction is often drawn between
"nursing homes" which offer some degree of medical care, in addition
to personal care, and "residential facilities" that provide only personal
or supervisory care with no medical component. 16
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id. at 5, Table 3. In 1985, 88.2 percent of all nursing home patients were over 65.
Of these, only 14.2% were aged 65-74, 34.1% were between 75 and 84, and 39.9% were
over 85. Id.
14. The nursing home population in 2020 has been projected at 4.2 million, with more
than 10 million elderly people in the community needing assistance with everyday tasks.
See GAO I, supra note 2, at 17.
15. See EBRI, supra note 2, at 6.
16. Nearly two-thirds of the facilities fell into the "nursing home" category (16,388
nursing homes versus 9,258 residential facilities). Because nursing homes were larger,
averaging 92 beds to 22 beds in residential facilities, they had nearly eight times as many
beds (1,507,400 versus 201,800). Nursing homes also had a higher occupancy rate: a
nationwide average of 91.7%, as compared to the 85.4% occupancy rate for residential
facilities. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 112 (No. 176. Nursing and Related Care Facili-
ties - Selected Characteristics: 1986) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract].
[Vol. XIX
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2. Comparing The Nursing Home Population To Nursing Home
Availability
According to U.S. government statistics for 1986, the last year for
which complete statistics have been tabulated, the U.S. contains
25,646 nursing homes, with approximately 1,553,000 residents. 7 A
large majority of these residents are age 65 or older."8 In recent years,
the AIDS epidemic appears to have increased the number of younger
nursing home patients, altering the balance somewhat from 1986
levels.
U.S. Government figures demonstrate a dearth in the supply of
nursing home beds. The lowest occupancy rate of 76.9% is found
among the comparatively few large residential facilities (14 facilities
with 300-499 beds).' 9 The highest occupancy rate of 95% is found
among facilities (both residential and nursing homes) with more than
500 beds.20 The small number of existing vacancies means that those
entering a nursing home may have to make compromises if there is a
long waiting list at a preferred facility. It also means that advocates
for the elderly and federal and state regulators face a practical limita-
tion on their enforcement powers. In other words, the threat to close
down a facility, or to move patients elsewhere, becomes an empty one
(even if there were no risk of harming the patients themselves through
transfer trauma)2' when there is no superior or even equivalent alter-
17. Id. at 104 (No. 162. Hospitals and Nursing Homes - Summary Characteristics:
1971 to 1986). About 80% of these homes were proprietary (20,223 proprietary versus
4,378 nonprofit-owned and 1,045 government-controlled (e.g., Veterans' Administration
facilities)). About 40% of the nursing homes had fewer than 25 beds; about 20% had 25-
74 beds; and about 40% had more than 75 beds (9,613; 6,605; and 9,428, respectively).
Id.
18. In 1986, a nationwide average of 90.4% of all nursing home residents were senior
citizens, with 9.3% aged 22-64. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Public Health
Service, Centers for Disease Control/National Center for Health Statistics: Vital and
Health Statistics: Nursing Home Characteristics: 1986 Inventory of Long-Term Care
Places, Series 14: Data from the National Health Survey No. 33, at 24, Table 25 (March
1989) [hereinafter Inventory].
19. Id. at 11, Table 4. Another survey divides facilities into "nursing homes," "hospi-
tal-based facilities," and "residential facilities," and finds a nationwide average occu-
pancy rate of 91.8% for nursing homes, 92.1% for hospital-based facilities, and 85.4%
for residential facilities, with noticeable state-to-state variations. Residential facilities are
operating at full capacity in Montana, but only 69.9% of capacity in Indiana; the overall
occupancy rate in Rhode Island is 96.2%, but only 84.9% in New Mexico. Inventory,
supra note 18, at 11, Table 4.
20. Statistical Abstract, supra note 16, at 112 (No. 176 Nursing and Related Care
Facilities-Selected Characteristics: 1986).
21. "Transfer trauma," also known as "relocation trauma," has been identified as a
cause of harm or even premature death of nursing home residents. See, e.g., Collette I.
Hughes, Liberty From Transfer Trauma: A Fundamental Life and Liberty Interest, 9
HASTINGS CONST. LAW QUARTERLY 429 (Winter 1982); Stitt v. Manor Care of Wil-
19911
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native facility available. One objective of the securities funding plan22
is to increase the number of facilities, and decrease average occupancy
rates, precisely so that facilities would be forced to compete to keep
their own patient census high.
Another issue of concern is the level of care offered which is related
to participation in the Medicaid/Medicare program. In 1986, 2,968
of the 16,399 nursing homes were not certified by the Medicare or
Medicaid programs.23 A non-certified facility may choose to forego
public-sector reimbursement in exchange for less interference. How-
ever, approximately half the nursing homes in the U.S. (8,045) were
certified as Medicare/Medicaid skilled nursing facilities ("SNFs"). 24
The 1990 Statistical Abstract's Inventory analysis excludes hospital-
based and residential facilities, but gives useful details about the medi-
cally-oriented facilities that are usually described as nursing homes.2"
The survey shows that the Midwest is the region with the largest
number of nursing homes (5,393); the South is next, with 5,008
homes, compared to the Northeast which has only 2,948.26 About
loughby, Inc., MMG 29,409 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Newland v. Kizer, 209 Cal. App. 3d 647, 257 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1989);
but see O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
22. Assuming it can be accomplished consonant with the Certificate of Need laws.
See discussion infra part IV.C.
23. Statistical Abstract, supra note 16, at 112 (No. 176. Nursing and Related Care
Facilities - Selected Characteristics: 1986).
24. Inventory, supra note 18, at 20, Table 18. Recent statistical findings demonstrate
an increasing trend in the numbers of SNFs. There were 7,262 SNFs in 1987, and 7,507
in 1988, so at least the number, though not necessarily the percentage of the total, of
SNFs is increasing. Statistical Abstract, supra note 16, at 111 (No. 175. Nursing and
Related Care Facilities: 1971 to 1988). Their average bed-count was 122 (for a total of
984,100 beds) and average occupancy rate was 92.9% (i.e., above the national average of
91% for all facilities). Facilities certified by Medicaid as intermediate-care facilities num-
bered 5,375 in 1986; these facilities provided a total of 411,500 beds to an average of 77
patients, and had an average occupancy rate of 90.3%. Id. at 112 (No. 176. Nursing and
Related Care Facilities - Selected Characteristics: 1986) Note that, as a result of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-268
§ 4211 (g) (1987), Medicaid has eliminated the distinction between Skilled Nursing Facili-
ties and Intermediate Care Facilities; Medicaid regulations now refer merely to "nursing
facilities," "NFs." However, the distinction is still meaningful for Medicare purposes,
because Part A nursing home benefits are payable only for skilled, not intermediate care.
25. Very small nursing homes were also somewhat uncommon. Only 8.2% of nurs-
ing homes nationwide had 3-9 beds (although nearly one-fifth-18.8%--of Western nurs-
ing homes fit this description). Nationwide, 6.5% of nursing homes had 10-24 beds
(ranging from 5.5% in the South and 5.6% in the Midwest, through 7.2% in the West
and 9.3% in the Northeast); corresponding figures for 25-49 bed nursing homes are
12.6% nationwide, 15.6% Northeast, 13.3% Midwest, 9.5% South, 13.5% West. Facili-
ties with 50-74 beds, and 75-99 bed facilities (medium-sized facilities) represented 18.5%
and 14.3% of facilities, respectively. See Inventory, supra note 18, at 16, Table 10.
26. See generally, Inventory, supra note 18.
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three-quarters of the nursing homes in this survey were proprietary.27
The survey also demonstrates that nursing home size can vary
significantly.2"
A nursing home's ownership status is another distinguishing attri-
bute that varies from state to state and must be considered prior to
implementation of the plan. The proposed consortium would consist
of proprietary facilities, so success of the plan depends on the availa-
bility of a large number and wide variety of proprietary facilities. As
the majority of United States nursing home facilities are proprietary,
this should pose little problem in most states. A breakdown by states,
however, demonstrates that the number of beds in proprietary facili-
ties varies according to location.29 For example, in California, more
than 85% of the beds were in proprietary nursing homes; the figure
for Oklahoma and Texas was near 88%. In contrast, New York has
an unusually low proportion of proprietary facilities, with only about
half of the nursing home beds located in proprietary facilities.3 ° In
order to be successful, the security financing plan must meet the needs
of the proprietary sector at the varying state levels, while taking into
account the fact that, in certain states, the nonprofit sector may play a
major role.
There are also significant state-by-state differences in the size of the
over-65 population, 31 and in the percentage of the over-65 population
residing in nursing homes.32 The connection between the two figures
27. Id. at 16, Table 10. The most common size for nursing homes was the 100-199
bed range, representing one-third of homes nationwide (but regional differences are espe-
cially significant here: only 22.1 % of Western nursing homes fit this pattern, but 40.4%
of the Southern homes came within this category, compared to 32% of those in the Mid-
west and 35.5% in the Northeast). Very few nursing homes (1.7% nationwide) had more
than 300 beds; only 4.9% had 200-299 beds.
28. Id. Most nursing homes have somewhere between 25-199 beds; more than half of
all nursing homes have fewer than 99 beds, and nearly two-thirds of all nursing homes
have more than 50 but fewer than 200 beds.
29. Id. at 19, Table 16.
30. Id. In New York, provisions are made for not-for-profit and "limited profit" cor-
porations to receive grants and issue debentures for nursing home project costs and to
borrow from the state's housing finance agency, medical care facilities agency, and re-
volving nursing home development fund. NEW YORK PUB. HEALTH LAW Art. 28-A
(McKinney 1985). The statutory purpose for permitting "limited profit" corporations is
that the need for nursing home beds for low-income people "cannot readily be provided
by the ordinary unaided operations of private enterprise .. " Id. §§ 2851, 2853(2).
31. See EBRI, supra note 2, at 19-20, Table 7.
32. See Inventory, supra note 18, at 17, Table 12. The elderly population in nursing
homes is 4.3% nationwide, with a low of 1.3% in Hawaii and a high of 7.4% in Minne-
sota. Contrary to expectations, Florida ranked quite low, with 2.2% of its elderly popula-
tion in nursing homes. Id.
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is the availability of nursing home beds per 1,000 persons over 65.
This ratio masks very large discrepancies in availability and balance
between the facilities in the various states.34
3. Nursing Home Costs and Funding Sources
In 1985, about half of the funds for the care of nursing home resi-
dents over 65 came from the residents themselves or their families.35
This figure tended to vary depending on the age of the resident. 36 Sta-
tistics also indicate that Medicare did not play a major role in paying
for nursing home care, which left Medicaid to assume nearly half the
burden.37 The Congressional Budget Office's figures for all long-term
care for fiscal year 1985 are slightly different.38
In 1986, overall nursing home costs had increased to $38.1 billion 39
33. Id. at 17, Table 11. In 1986, 60.6 beds were available nationwide for every thou-
sand people over 65 (51.6 of them in nursing homes, 6.9 in residential facilities, and 2.1 in
hospital-based facilities).
34. Id. While the common belief that Florida has a large elderly population is true,
the perception that Florida retirees flock to nursing homes is incorrect. Minnesota, Ne-
braska, North Dakota, and Wisconsin had a very high level of capacity (all above 85 beds
per 1,000 elderly citizens; Nebraska had 95.3 beds per thousand). Availability was lowest
in Nevada (33.6 beds per thousand) and in Southern states such as Alabama (47.5 per
thousand), Mississippi (45 per thousand), South Carolina (45.1 per thousand), and amaz-
ingly low in Florida (34 per thousand). Id.
35. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 16, at 113 (No. 177. - Nursing Home Resi-
dents - Living Arrangements Prior to Admission, Source of Payment and Dependency
Status, By Age and Sex: 1985).
36. The "young-old" (65-74) provided 38.1% of the total paid for their care; the fig-
ure was much higher, at 51.2% and 53.5% respectively, for those 75-84 and 85 and over.
Id.
37. Id. Medicare assumed 5.3% of the overall bill (5.5%, 5.7% and 4.8% respec-
tively for the three age groups). Medicaid assumed 13.6% of the total spent on SNF care
(nearly uniform through the three age groups) and 25.7% of the cost of ICF care (31.9%
for those 65-74, 24.8% for those aged 75-84, and 24.3% for over-85 nursing home resi-
dents). Virtually no long-term care insurance was available in 1985; certainly no appreci-
able benefits were collected in that year.
38. See GAO I, supra note 2, at 34. This report indicates that 45% of costs came
from patients and their relatives (a total of $16.2 billion). Other private sources (e.g.,
insurance) paying 2%, Medicare paying 7%, and Medicaid paying 41% of the total
($17.2 billion, or 90% of public funds expended for nursing home care; of this amount,
$9.5 billion came from the federal government, $7.7 billion from the various states).
One explanation for the discrepancy is the different definition of long-term care, here
including home care as well as institutional care. Approximately $9 billion was spent for
home care, versus $36 billion on nursing care. Id.
39. Alan L. Otten, States, Alarmed by Outlays on Long-Term Care, Seek Ways to
Encourage More Private Coverage, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at 58. $19.4 billion pri-
vate out-of-pocket costs by patients and their families, $0.3 billion from private insurance,
$0.6 billion from Medicare, $15.9 billion from Medicaid, the balance from all other public
and private sources. Id. See also Glenn Ruffenach, Nursing-Home Care as a Work Bene-
fit, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1988, at 25; U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services news
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as compared to home care costs which remained stable at $9 billion.
The figures for 198740 also show an overall increase to $40.6 billion
for nursing home expenses.41 In short, unless LTC insurance becomes
a major payment source for nursing home care, or unless the Medi-
care program is expanded to cover custodial care, neither of which
seems likely, the Medicaid system will have to cope with cost in-
creases associated with the unavoidable increases in both the number
of nursing home patients and the extent of their dependency.42
To date, much of the financing to construct and operate nursing
homes has been debt financing, taking the form of mortgages on the
facilities. Before the Deficit Reduction and Fiscal Responsibility Act
(DEFRA) took effect, nursing homes had access to tax-free debt fi-
nancing, but Section 2314 of DEFRA terminated this option.43 To
compound the problem, the credit market, in turn, views nursing
homes as rather risky borrowers, in part because they are so heavily
dependent on Medicaid, and also because owners are unable to con-
trol the level of Medicaid reimbursement.
Because of the high costs of debt financing, nursing homes must
rely heavily upon Medicaid funds to cover infrastructure and operat-
ing costs. Additionally, compliance with stringent Medicaid require-
ments can preclude facilities from ejecting a non-paying patient."
release, Mar. 29, 1988, reprinted in Medicare! Medicaid Guide (CCH) Last Report Letter
#552, at 8.
40. See EBRI, supra note 2, at 7, Chart 1.
41. Id. The percentage of out-of-pocket payments increased to 49%; other private
sources such as insurance paid 2% of the total, Medicare and other government sources
paid 5%, leaving Medicaid with 44% of the cost burden.
42. A General Accounting Office study of the period September 1988-1989 reports
that:
Historically, about 40 percent of elderly nursing home residents enter as Medi-
caid recipients, about 50 percent as private payers, and the remaining 10 per-
cent under private insurance, Medicare, or other public programs. Some of
those who enter a nursing home as private payers, however, subsequently be-
come Medicaid-eligible. One recent study found that about 11 percent of those
entering as private payers spent down to Medicaid eligibility levels during their
stay. Overall, about two-thirds of nursing home residents are receiving Medi-
caid assistance at any point.
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: ADMISSION
PROBLEMS FOR MEDICAID RECIPIENTS AND ATrEMPTS TO SOLVE THEM, GAO/HRD-
90-135, at 10 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter GAO II]. See also Korbin Liu, Pamela Doty, and
Kenneth Manton, Medicaid Spenddown in Nursing Homes, 30 THE GERONTOLOGIST 7-
10 (1990).
43. Deficit Reduction and Fiscal Responsibility Act ("DEFRA"), Pub. L. No. 98-
369, 98 Stat 494 § 2314. See also LONG TERM CARE AND THE LAW 26, (The National
Health Lawyers Association Tenth Annual Symposium) (Thomas C. Fox ed. 1986).
44. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat.
1330-268 § 4211 (1987). There are also state laws forbidding Medicaid discrimination in
1991]
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Nursing homes can avoid this "problem" of complying with the
Medicaid rules by avoiding participation in the program; however this
course of action would cut them off from a major source of funds. 5
Moreover, what would a non-Medicaid-certified facility do in the very
common situation in which a patient depletes all assets by paying pri-
vately for care? True, there is no outright federal prohibition of dis-
charge of patients because they are Medicaid-eligible if the facility
does not participate in Medicaid, but if the facility can evict the pa-
tient without violating state law, the choices are finding another place-
ment that does accept Medicaid (a difficult task), or literally throwing
the patient out on the street. The latter is hardly good public rela-
tions for a facility that seeks to attract private-pay patients.
When a nursing home does issue bonds, rating agencies seldom rate
the debt highly enough to make it attractive to institutional investors
such as pension funds. A lower rating means that the nursing homes
must pay a higher interest rate, making it even more likely that they
will default on their obligations. Health-care chains, for whom con-
ventional stock issues are an option, have had a history of poor stock
performance even in a bull market.
Despite the tremendous need for more nursing home beds, and for
capital and staffing improvements in existing facilities, it seems very
unlikely that the capital markets will be responsive to nursing homes.
The securities plan has the advantage of creating a significant pool of
new capital from individual investors to be used by the nursing home
industry. Implementation of the plan is necessary to compartmental-
ize the need for nursing home financing given the unresponsiveness of
more traditional financing mechanisms.
nursing homes, or forbidding transfers or discharges of patients motivated solely by the
change of payment mechanism from private payment to Medicaid. See, e.g., CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 14124.7 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-533 (1986 & Supp.
1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.17(5) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-
108(a)(3) (Michie 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.31 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); KY.
REV. STAT. § 205.560(9) (Michie 1991); LA. REV. STAT. § 40:2010.8 (West Supp. 1990);
ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 22, § 7925 (Supp. 1990); MD. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-345 (1990);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 333.21773 (1980 & & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651
(West 1989); NEBRASKA REV. STAT. § 71-6023.01 (West 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 167.17-b(h) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.2 (1988 & Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-24.4-19 (Michie 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit 51, § 5111.31 (Page 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1918(c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
17.5-19 (Michie 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-88 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1989);
TEX. HUM. RES. § 102.003(f) (Vernon 1990).
45. As noted above, very few patients are able to remain in private pay status
throughout their stay in the nursing home.
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B. A Critical Look at Medicaid and Medicare
The close relationship between nursing home financing and public
funding programs mandates a careful examination of the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Medicare provides benefits similar to those
provided by private Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance to persons over
65.46 For example, when a senior citizen suffers a heart attack, is hos-
pitalized for a few days, and then immediately discharged to the care
of a physician, the patient pays comparatively little of the eventual
bill. On the other hand, the program does little to address the medi-
cal, social and housing needs of impaired older persons and the chron-
ically ill. Furthermore, the statutes and regulations are administered
in an extremely restrictive manner, similarly limiting the practical
availability of Medicare funds. Thus, although Congress intended for
Medicare to provide comprehensive health care for the poor, the high
cost of LTC, along with Medicare's limited LTC provisions, have
combined to force the Medicaid system to take a major role in LTC
financing.
Unlike private insurance, which is available regardless of income or
assets, Medicaid-eligibility is restricted.47 To qualify for Medicaid
46. Congress enacted Medicare as Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C
§§ 1395-1395ccc (1983). Part A of Medicare provides extensive benefits for hospitaliza-
tion, and limited benefits for up to 100 days of care in a skilled nursing home for recuper-
ation subsequent to hospitalization. Certain home care benefits are also available to
individuals who are diagnosed as home-bound. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (Supp. 1990) Part B
provides payment for care rendered by physicians and certain other health professionals
to Medicare beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 13951 (Supp. 1990) Part A benefits are available
automatically to all recipients of Social Security checks. Senior citizens must make an
affirmative election to receive Part B benefits, and must pay a monthly premium for the
benefits.
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, Pub. L. No. 100-360, §§ 101-429, 102 Stat.
683 (1988), somewhat expanded Medicare hospitalization and skilled nursing home bene-
fits, added coverage of prescription drug expenses and limited beneficiaries' out-of pocket
expenses for services covered by Part B of the Act. The Act was politically unpopular,
however, and was subsequently repealed by the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979 (1989).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988). Medicaid is a joint federal/state program under
which the federal government pays at least half of an eligible individual's health care
costs and the states pay the remainder. Federal law sets the basic parameters of the
Medicaid system, but states have extensive discretion in administering the program. Ac-
cordingly, the availability of Medicaid services varies greatly from state to state.
In 1980, Congress attempted to set standards for state reimbursement of health care
costs by passing the Boren Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(A). The amend-
ment required Medicaid reimbursement rates under state Medicaid plans to be reasonable
and adequate in light of the cost of operating a facility efficiently. The amendment gives
providers a substantive federal right enforceable by § 1983. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). See also Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes, Inc. v.Barry,
56 Ohio St. 3d 120, 564 N.E.2d 686 (1990); Michigan Hosp. Ass'n v. Babcock, 1991 U.S.
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benefits, an individual must meet the state's definition of "indigent," a
concept which takes into account both income and assets.48 Under
present conditions, Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal, state and
public sector programs pay approximately two-thirds of the cost of
LTC.
By getting legal and financial advice about Medicaid planning, indi-
viduals with moderate or even large assets can qualify for Medicaid
although they are not "indigent" in the ordinary sense of the term.
As practiced by elder law attorneys, "Medicaid planning" includes
making gifts before a penalty period begins; transferring assets to ir-
revocable trusts; creating convertible trusts that become irrevocable
when a Medicaid application is made; and structuring ownership and
investments to conform to Medicaid rules.49 The elder law attorney
must acknowledge the tax as well as Medicaid consequences of these
transactions. For example, trusts must be drafted with special care in
order to insure that the planner's goals of providing income to the
elderly grantor and/or spouse can be met without jeopardizing Medi-
caid eligibility. 50
"Spend-down" is also an important factor in Medicaid eligibility.
In order to spend-down, a person enters a nursing home as a private-
Dist. Lexis 2058 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Temple University v. White, 941 F.2d 201 (3d. Cir.1991) (all involving successful rate challenges by providers). But see Capitol Hill Hosp.
v. District of Columbia, 769 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1991) (courts withheld approval of
disputed Medicaid rates in the District of Columbia pending review by the Department of
Human Services Office of Health Care Financing).
48. Generally, individuals with low income, higher income offset by high medical
expenses, and very limited assets over and above those assets that would be exempt for
Medicaid purposes, may qualify as "indigent."
49. See JOHN J. REGAN, TAX, ESTATE & FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY
(1982); PETER J. STRAUSS, ROBERT WOLF & DANA SHILLING, AGING AND THE LAW
332-37 (CCH 1990 & Supp. 1992). For recent developments in the area of Medicaid
planning, see generally THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAELA 3RD ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM
ON ELDER LAW (991); Louis A. Mezzullo, Advice On Planning For Medicaid Qualifica-
tion, 130 TRUSTS & ESTATES 8 (July, 1991); Ruth Longenecker, Planning For Medicaid
Eligibility, 15 TAX MGMT ESTATES, GIFTS & TRUSTS JOURNAL 131 (July-August 1990).
The entire process of Medicaid planning has been criticized on ethical and public pol-
icy grounds. See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, Do Only Suckers Pay?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18,
1989, at 52; Stephen Moses, The Fallacy of Impoverishment, 30 THE GERONTOLOGIST 21
(1991).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (1988). The corpus of a "Medicaid qualifying trust" set
up by a person or a person's spouse will be considered an available asset that limits or
precludes Medicaid eligibility to the extent that the trustee has discretion to invade the
corpus. The maximum permissible invasion will be considered an available asset, regard-
less of whether or not invasion actually occurs. Medicaid imposes transfer restrictions
when an individual applies for nursing home benefits, but not when the application is for
certain forms of home care benefits; however, the availability of Medicaid home care
benefits is limited. Id.
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pay patient and pays several thousand dollars a month until all non-
exempt assets over and above the permitted Medicaid level, typically
$3,000 or less, are exhausted. 51 A spend-down can occur either vol-
untarily, as part of a plan to qualify for Medicaid, or involuntarily, if
the individual is unaware of the full cost of LTC or the rules of the
Medicaid system. An unplanned spend-down is much more painful
and destructive of family financial security than a planned spend-
down which could occur as part of a plan dealing with other needs of
family.52
In addition to ethical questions, practical limitations can affect
Medicaid planning. Not all forms of care are available under the
Medicaid program, and not all the care provided is of the highest
quality. 53 Medicaid beneficiaries are especially vulnerable to the prob-
lem of quality control because the program's reimbursement rates are
much lower than private-pay rates. Additionally, state regulators
have very few personnel to inspect nursing homes, and monitoring the
quality of care provided in a person's home can be difficult. Indeed,
the assumption that all providers will deliver first-rate care to the vul-
nerable elderly under conditions where reimbursement rates are low
and supervision is limited, is unrealistic.54 Furthermore, the Medi-
caid program is a tremendous and increasing burden on the federal
and state treasuries. These financial and practical constraints make it
unlikely that the public sector will be able to expand the Medicaid
51. See Medicare/Medicaid Guide (CCH) 15,500-660 (containing charts which list
the permitted asset levels and exempt resources for each state). The typical exemptions
are a homestead, home furnishings, an automobile, and a burial fund.
52. See EBRI, supra note 2, at 8-9. The EBRI study performed in Massachusetts in
1988 found that 57% of married institutionalized individuals had spent-down and quali-
fied for Medicaid within one year of entering the facility. In addition, 83% of single
individuals who were not entitled to make use of Medicaid's spousal protection provi-
sions and higher asset limits for married couples had spent-down within a year, and 74%
had spent down within 6.5 months of private payment for nursing home care. A model
constructed with EBRI's own research shows that, as a result of the expanded spousal
protection provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 30% of married insti-
tutionalized elderly persons could spend-down to Medicaid levels within one year. Thir-
teen percent of single men and 23% of single women could-spend down within six
months. Half of the women could spend-down within 18 months; 53% of men could do
so within two years. The gender differences derive from men's higher earnings and asset
levels.
53. For a discussion of quality control issues in healthcare, see, e.g., William D.
Spector & Margaret L. Drugovich, Reforming Nursing Home Quality Regulation: Impact
on Cited Deficiencies and Nursing Home Outcomes, 27 MEDICAL CARE 789 (Aug. 1989).
54. All state Medicaid plans must include nursing home services, but states have wide
discretion in determining how much home care and ADL assistance they will provide.
See Ellice Fatoullah, Medicaid and Elder Law, 1991 Legislative Update, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
25, 1991, at 1.
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program to meet the needs of the large "baby boom" generation for
long-term care in the next few decades." Conversely, a private sector
solution can harmonize these concerns by creating a mechanism
which allows for affordable saving for one's own eventual care and the
care of family members, thereby reducing the risk of impoverishment.
C. Existing and Proposed Financing Alternatives
It would not be an accurate picture of long-term financing to depict
a stark opposition between private payment, leading to complete de-
pletion of resources, and Medicaid, conditioned on a prior depletion
of resources. The variety of alternatives already in place include long-
term care insurance and reverse mortgages. In addition, many gov-
ernment agencies and organizations have responded with legislative
changes or proposals for improved financing mechanisms.
1. Private LTC Insurance
Private LTC insurance ("LTC") is a well-accepted mechanism for
risk planning. Most senior citizens have one or more Medi-Gap56 pol-
icies to supplement their Medicare coverage and there is an increasing
consumer interest in purchasing LTC policies. Although LTC poli-
cies are sometimes thought of as "nursing home" policies, there is an
increasing trend towards policies which cover home care as well as
institutional care. Furthermore, insurers are showing greater interest
in providing such policies. In 1987, an industry survey found a total
of 17 insurers to be engaged in the selling of LTC policies.17 In 1988,
43 companies sold LTC policies to individuals and 11 sold policies to
groups, including employers purchasing insurance as an employee
benefit. By 1989, group LTC coverage could be purchased from 19
companies providing individual consumers seeking an LTC policy
55. See, e.g., Howard L. Schneider & Jack M. Guralnik, The Aging of America: Im-
pact on Health Care Costs, 263 JAMA 2335 (1990); Regina E. Herzlinger, Healthy com-
petition: a third approach to the medical-insurance crisis; Proposal to enable Americans to
shop competitively for their own health insurance policies, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Au-
gust 1991, at 69.
56. Medi-Gap policies cover deductibles, coinsurance, and a certain number of items
excluded from Medicaid. They do not cover long-term care. Insurers are forbidden to
sell Medi-Gap policies in anything other than ten standard forms prescribed by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commission (NAIC). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 §§ 4351-61, 104 Stat. 1388 (1987) (effective July 1,
1991). For a history of Medi-Gap policies and their regulation, see Carol Olson, Review
of Medicare Supplement Insurance After Repeal of the Medicare Catastrophe Coverage
Act, (NAIC 1990). See also CBO says Medigap Policies Can Curb Enrollees' Acute Care
Out-Of-Pocket Costs, 18 BNA PENSION REPORTER No. 33, August 19, 1991 at 1515.
57. Chuck Jones, LAN's 3rd Annual Long-Term Care Survey, LIFE ASSURANCE
NEWS, May, 1989, at 76.
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with a choice of 52 insurers.58 The Health Insurance Institute of
America (HIAA) estimates that, as of June, 1990, 1.65 million poli-
cies, written by 134 insurers, were in force. 59
At first glance, LTC insurance appears to provide a simple solution
to the needs of the middle-class elderly. Indeed, in 1989, there were
1.1 million LTC policyholders. 60 To protect policyholders against in-
surer abuse, the Health Insurance Association of America's Board has
drafted a comprehensive and consumer-oriented set of guidelines for
LTC policies.6 Many states have since followed suit by adopting re-
lated statutory controls on LTC policies. 62 The great advantage of
LTC insurance is that it does not limit elderly purchasers' financial
planning options. That is, if purchasers are adequately insured, they
can make gifts or retain property based on personal preference, tax
and estate planning objectives, without worrying about the effect of
Medicaid-eligibility requirements on asset transfers.
While LTC insurance may appear to be the solution to the problem
of insuring long-term care for the elderly, it is problematic when com-
pared to more traditional life and health insurance policies. While it
is possible to predict both the number of deaths in an entire popula-
tion and the incidence of disease throughout the population, it is not
possible to predict an individual's lifespan or the morbidity he or she
will suffer Thus, the smaller the group in question, and the less "aver-
age" its composition, the less valid are the conclusions and predic-
tions made about the group. In addition, LTC insurance is a new
product with little past history to draw upon. Furthermore, because
only about one of every 250 Americans owns such a policy, the poli-
cyholders are a small and unrepresentative group.
Compared to LTC insurance, life insurance and health insurance
are popular and broadly owned products with a great deal of actuarial
information available for use in setting premiums and for the insurers'
own financial planning and projected claims. A plausible explanation
exists for the limited growth of LTC insurance. The fundamental
problem appears to be that LTC insurance may not offer returns that
are attractive enough to constitute a viable product for insurance
providers.63 In other words, if the insurance is attractive only to a
58. Id.
59. Susan Van Gilder & Diane Johnson, Long-Term Care Insurance: A Market Up-
date, HIAA RESEARCH BULLETIN 4-5 (1991).
60, Jennifer Landes, Supply and Demand for LTC Grows, NATIONAL UNDER-
WRITER, June 5, 1989, at 3.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The return provided by such policies must cover current claims, a reserve for
19911
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small, elderly population at a high risk of institutionalization in the
near future, it will be very unattractive to the insurers who must pay
claims of indefinite duration and amount shortly after the receipt of
premiums. Individual consumers, many of whom are retired and
have low incomes, buy LTC insurance with after-tax income, after
paying living expenses and life and Medi-Gap insurance premiums.
Thus, unlike employers who consider buying insurance one of the
costs of doing business, these consumers are more sensitive to price
increases making it difficult for insurers to increase returns by raising
prices.
Some of the insurers' problems could be solved by broadening the
base of policyholders. With more policyholders and with wider age
range, insurers would have more time to earn income on the premi-
ums before paying them out as policy benefits. Unfortunately, barri-
ers to selling LTC insurance to young and middle-aged buyers include
general ignorance regarding whether Medicare will pay for custodial
care, denial that they will ever grow old, and an absence of disposable
income to cover premiums. Perhaps insurers can overcome these
marketing problems and sell enough LTC policies to make the prod-
uct economically viable; however, controlling doctor's bills and hospi-
tal care costs pose additional problems.
Furthermore, a built-in paradox complicates selling LTC to
younger buyers.. LTC polices usually offer a level premium through-
out the life of the policy, so buying the policy at an earlier age locks in
a lower premium. But what benefits does the premium purchase? If
the policy provides a certain level of benefits (e.g., $120 a day), and
the policy is kept up for many years, $120 may prove to be only a
small fraction of the actual private-pay cost when the insured person
is institutionalized. In other words, policies with fixed benefits are
beneficial to the insurer (which can at least make some realistic
plans), and can be affordable for the younger buyer-but are unlikely
to be attractive to the younger buyer because of inflation and inability
to foresee a need. On the other hand, the policy can include meaning-
ful inflation protection, but only at the cost of increasing the risk as-
sumed by the insurer and the premiums.
Several elder law specialists" have pointed out that LTC insurance
costs can be reduced by using the policy as a "hedging" mechanism.
The maximum Medicaid penalty period is 30 months. If a person
future claims, which are very difficult to estimate, marketing and administrative expenses
for the policies themselves, and a contribution toward the overall expenses of the insurer.
It is unclear whether, in the long run, LTC insurance will succeed as a product.
64. E.g. Ezra Huber, Esq. through personal communications with the author.
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planning to make transfer who has purchased an LTC policy is insti-
tutionalized before the penalty period elapses, the policy is available
to pay for nursing home care until the person becomes eligible for
Medicaid. Once Medicaid benefits are granted, the policy can be
dropped. However, this strategy depends on a person who is at high
risk of institutionalization being able to buy a policy as underwriting
guidelines can be so strict that only healthy people qualify. The finan-
cial value of this strategy may further be limited if a deductible period
of several months is imposed by the particular policy.
This discussion has assumed that anyone who wants an LTC policy
can get one, that insurers make policies availible at all price levels,
and that, once purchased and maintained, the policy will in fact pro-
vide benefits when needed. In reality, economic factors preclude
many willing buyers from purchasing LTC insurance as well as many
insurers from offering LTC insurance. A recent Families USA study
casts doubt on all of these assumptions by illustrating the affordability
problem elderly people currently face65 and the assumptions inherent
in the belief that private LTC provides a solution that can encompass
a significant percentage of the elderly population.66
65. Families USA Foundation Report, The Unaffordability Of Nursing Home Insur-
ance, January, 1990, at 2.
This study examined widely-sold LTC polices offered by nine insurers with A + or A
rating from A.M. Best-that is, insurers of the highest quality and stability. The study
focused on a basic LTC policy, defined as one meeting these criteria: benefits available
for at least two years; deductible period (during which the newly-admitted nursing home
resident pays the entire bill out-of-pocket, unless Medicare SNF benefits are available) of
no more than 90-100 days; a daily benefit of at least $110 per day--or at least $80 per day
with an "escalator clause" to provide protection against inflation; availability of benefits
even if the insured person enters the nursing home directly from the community, without
prior hospitalization; no "step-down" clause: that is, the insured can get the level of
treatment appropriate for his or her needs, with no requirement of receiving skilled care
before receiving intermediate-level or custodial care. Id.
66. Id. According to the Families USA study, a policy of this type actually falls below
the minimum level of coverage recommended by Consumer Reports in its May, 1988
survey of LTC insurance. Who Can Afford a Nursing Home?, CONSUMER REPORTS,
May, 1988, at 300. Consumer Reports recommends at least four years of benefit coverage
and a deductible of 20 days or less, so the "basic" policy is therefore significantly less
expensive than the Consumer Reports-recommended type of policy. Yet the average pre-
mium for the basic policy was unaffordable for 84% of senior citizens aged 65-79; even
the lowest price policy meeting the basic standards was unaffordable for 73% of Ameri-
cans aged 65-79. The older the senior citizen, the less likely that he or she could afford a
basic policy. "Affordability" was defined as medical expenses (including LTC premiums)
of not more than 10% of income. However, the definition of income included a "spend-
down" by assuming that the individual's assets would be liquidated at a constant rate,
leaving no estate. According to a 1988 study by United Seniors Health Cooperative, a
prior hospitalization requirement would prevent 54% of nursing home residents from
receiving insurance benefits. The repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988 reimposed the prior-hospitalization requirement on the Medicare Part A SNF bene-
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It is certainly conceivable that other studies, using different meth-
odology, would conclude that a higher percentage of senior citizens
would be able to afford LTC insurance. Nonetheless, spending hun-
dreds or thousands of dollars a year on LTC insurance premiums will
remain a strain for many elderly households. Furthermore, at least
some LTC policyholders will purchase and maintain coverage that
proves unsuitable for their actual needs.67
2. Reverse Mortgages
While LTC insurance is a valuable adjunct to some financial plans,
it is not the whole answer to the problem of funding long-term care
for the middle class. Reverse mortgages provide what can be viewed
as an alternative supplement to LTC insurance. This type of mort-
gage operates under the assumption that cash-poor senior citizens are
often "house-rich." 68 For example, an elderly person or couple with a
low income and few other assets may own a mortgage-free home that
has appreciated significantly since its purchase.69 A reverse mortgage
is a way to "liquify" the homeowner's equity without selling the
house. In particular, reverse mortgages have been recommended as a
private-sector method for financing the cost of long-term care.7°
Under a reverse annuity mortgage ("RAM"), the senior citizen
homeowner receives a lump sum which is used to buy an annuity.
Various types of "equity kickers" may be granted so that the lender
receives a share in the appreciation in home value after the home's
eventual sale. A simpler alternative is for the elderly person to secure
fit, so no one entering a nursing home from the community can get Part A benefits either.
The same United Senior Health Cooperative study showed that 46% of nursing home
residents wouldn't get coverage under a policy that contained a step-down requirement.
67. Examples might include a person who enters a nursing home without having first
been hospitalized who has a policy with a prior hospitalization requirement; or a person
with low income and few other assets who has a policy with a two-year maximum benefit,
which runs out early in the person's seven-year stay in the nursing home.
68. For instance, in 1985, Medicaid recipients in the eight states selected for study
owned real property with an average value of $30,712 per recipient. See UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: RECOVERIES FROM NURSING HOME
RESIDENTS; ESTATES COULD OFFSET PROGRAM COSTS, GAO/HRD 89-56, at 20
(March 1989).
69. In 1983, for instance, 17.8 million senior citizens were homeowners; 80% of them
owned their homes free and clear, without mortgage. ALICE M. RIVLIN & JOSHUA M.
WIENER, CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY: WHO WILL PAY? 131 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Bruce Jacobs & William Weissert, Using Home Equity to Finance Long-
Term Care, 12 J. OF HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW 77 (1987). (An econometric
model is used to show that 48% of the senior citizens who are at a 10% or greater risk of
institutionalization could use reverse mortgages to pay for home care in lieu of being
institutionalized; they also show the greatest benefits from reverse mortgages accruing to
the most vulnerable elderly).
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an ordinary home equity credit line, and keep it in reserve for medical
costs.7 The basic terms of a reverse mortgage involve a bank or other
lender making a loan, usually limited to 80% of the appraised value of
the home. Instead of the homeowner then making monthly payments
to the lender, the lender makes payments to the homeowner. These
payments can be used to supplement retirement income, including
one spouse's nursing home care while the other spouse continues to
reside in the home. The annual payments usually range between
$6,000 and $7,800.72
At the end of the loan term, or if the senior citizen dies or is institu-
tionalized during the loan term, the senior citizen homeowner owes
the amount of the mortgage or, in some cases, may have the option to
refinance. Generally, this "balloon payment" is made by selling the
home. This makes the selection of the loan term crucial. The longer
the loan term, the smaller each payment to the senior citizen will be,
making it less likely that the extra income will affect a recipient's
lifestyle. Yet, maximizing income by shortening the loan term creates
a risk of losing the house altogether. To make matters worse, reverse
mortgages seldom contain refund provisions. Thus, the lender takes
the risk that the sale proceeds from the home will not be large enough
to satisfy the mortgage. The borrower takes the risk that he or she
will die long before the loan term expires, so that, in effect, the lender
"buys" the home for a small number of payments.
One effect of the reverse mortgage is to make it very unlikely that
the house will remain in the family after the death of the homeowner.
This objection is insuperable for some families and trivial in others,
where estate planning requires removal of a major asset from the es-
tate. This is usually the case where all the children are already home-
owners and do not want to inherit the "family home," or where the
elderly individual has never married, has no children, or has no desire
for children to inherit the house. 73 Finally, reverse mortgages do not
interfere with Medicaid planning. This is because a reverse mortgage
is considered a debt of the aged homeowner, not a source of income,
71. RIVLIN & WIENER, supra note 69.
72. Id. at 292.
73. A small four-year HUD demonstration project for home equity conversions for
the elderly was created under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987.
Pub. L. No. 100-242 §§ 1-706, 101 Stat. 1815 (1988). In October, 1990 the ABA recom-
mended that the program be expanded from 2,500 mortgages to 25,000. Several states
regulate reverse mortgages. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1917.320 - 1917.714 (West
1985 & Supp 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17 312 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp 1991);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 528.1 - 528.9 (West Supp 1990); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 280
(McKinney 1989).
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and therefore will not affect eligibility.74
3. Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs)
For many senior citizens who do not require institutionalization,
the family home is no longer a suitable residence. It may be too large,
too hard to clean and care for, too expensive to heat, in need of exten-
sive renovation, in a dangerous neighborhood, or inaccessible to shop-
ping, recreation, and medical care.
One alternative for fairly affluent senior citizens is to move to a life-
care community or continuing care retirement community
("CCRC"). Depending on the definition used, and the survey meth-
odology employed, anywhere from 100,000 to 200,000 elderly Ameri-
cans live in CCRCs.75 The CCRC combines living accommodations
suitable for the elderly with the availability of nursing home care on
the premises or nearby.
There are three general types of CCRCs. In an "all-inclusive"
community, the fees paid by the residents cover both housing and
medical care; under a "modified" CCRC contract, the resident pays
some of the cost of transferring from ordinary housing to the commu-
nity's nursing home. In a "fee-for-service" community, residents are
guaranteed access to nursing home care, but must pay for it on a per
diem basis. About one-third of CCRCs fall into each category.76
Entering a CCRC calls for a sizable entry fee, often equivalent to
most of the entrant's assets, in addition to a monthly maintenance
charge.77 Thus, entering a CCRC in some ways resembles buying a
co-op apartment or condominium unit. The important difference is
that the CCRC resident does not have an equity interest in the hous-
ing unit in which he or she lives. In 1984, it was estimated that only
13% of the population, aged 75 or older, could afford to enter a
CCRC.78
In addition to affordability problems, a person who can pay the
74. This is not necessarily true for state programs that supplement Social Security, or
for state programs that provide home care and housekeeper service.
75. See GAO I, supra note 2, at 41. (The American Association of Homes for the
Aging provided the 200,000 figure).
76. See EBRI, supra note 2, at 12.
77. See RIVLIN & WIENER, supra note 69, at 85-86. In 1987 dollars, the median fee
paid by a single person for a one bedroom apartment was estimated at $47,927; a 1986
survey gave a median monthly cost of $756 per CCRC resident. Id.
78. See RIVLIN & WIENER, supra note 69, at 92. Compare the model used in EBRI
Issue Brief, supra note 2, at 16 in which it was estimated that 11% of the total population
over 65 could afford to pay an entry fee of $64,226 (and still retain $10,000 in cash or
other assets), and pay a monthly fee of $1,300 while still retaining 60% of their income
while only 9% of the over-75 population could afford to do this.
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costs necessary to enter a CCRC may not wish to do so because of
certain drawbacks. The CCRC environment is admittedly restrictive,
and the entry fee is hardly inexpensive. Similarly, it is difficult or
impossible for a CCRC resident to move out. This inability to relocate
exists, in part, because alternative CCRC accommodations are scarce
with many communities having waiting lists longer than the life ex-
pectancy of their clientele.
Furthermore, CCRCs are vulnerable to financial problems or even
bankruptcy.7 9 In the past, the unscrupulous have used CCRCs as a
means to prey on the vulnerable elderly through deceptive schemes.
CCRCs have also been plagued by failure due to poor management
skills. s
Consumers can protect themselves by getting professional advice,
and also by taking advantage of the extensive disclosure provisions
imposed on CCRCs by many states.81 Although a well-run, finan-
cially sound CCRC can provide a very agreeable place for a senior
citizen to live, with assurances that medical and nursing services will
be available when necessary, a number of drawbacks keep the CCRC
from being a complete solution to the problem of care for the middle-
class elderly. For example, to enter a CCRC, both members of a mar-
ried couple must qualify for entrance to the facility. More specifi-
cally, they must both want to live there, which means, in effect,
leaving the community and restricting most daily contacts to other
79. See GAO I, supra note 2, at 41 citing RIVLIN & WIENER, supra note 69, at 89.
80. Non-profit organizations sometimes may be more oriented to their charitable mis-
sion than to effective management. In 1988, 95% of CCRCs were operated by nonprofit
organizations, according to Sheldon Goldberg, president of the American Association of
Homes for the Aging. See Louise Saul, Interest Grows in Continuing-Care Communities
for Elderly, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 28, 1988, at 1.
81. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1801-12 (1990) (This statute expires Jan.
1, 1991 unless renewed); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1770-93 (West 1990 & Supp.
1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-13-101-19 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-360-
75 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.001-.134 (West 1984 & Supp.
1990); IDAHO CODE § 67-2750-64 (1989); ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 1111/2, para. 4160-1-12
(Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523D.1-10 (West Supp. 1991);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2171-88 (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A,
§§ 6201-26 (West 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 70B, §§ 7-23 (1988 & Supp. 1990):
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 76 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.900-.50
(Vernon Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §' 52:27D-330-60 (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-17-1-18 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4600-20 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 173.13 (Anderson 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, §§ 3201-25 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-59-1-17 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 4-3-1305 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-4900-17 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.38.025 (West Supp. 1991). See also STRAUSS, WOLF & SHILLING, supra
note 49; Lisa Stearns, Ellen Netting & Cindy Wilson, Continuing Care Retirement Com-
munities, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 245 (1989).
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elderly community residents, and limiting daily activities to only
those offered by the CCRC. In addition, they must have sufficient
funds to make the initial payment and continuing monthly payments
and be willing to devote the necessary proportion of their resources to
this purpose. The chosen CCRC, therefore, must meet the standard of
both being suitable for its residents' needs and having sound financial
prospects. Additionally, because there are fewer than 1,000 CCRCs
nationwide, some senior citizens may not be able to find a suitable
CCRC in their desired geographic area.82
4. Proposals For Reform
The need for new funding mechanisms for long-term health care is
widely acknowledged, and various proposals have been developed in
an attempt to meet this need. One such proposal was set forth by the
U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care (the
"Pepper Commission"). In its September 25, 1990 final report, the
Commission recommended a hybrid approach to long-term health
care financing.83 The approach contemplated the existence of social
insurance providing full coverage of community-based home care, but
did not suggest expanding the Medicare program to provide all forms
of long-term care without income or asset limitations.8 4
Under the Pepper Commission's recommendations, the U.S. Gov-
ernment would cover the first three months of nursing home care to
all individuals meeting a test of disability.85 For longer stays, the plan
calls for a combination of federal and state funding, with subsidies for
low-income nursing home residents. In addition to allowances for
spousal income, personal needs, and maintenance of the homestead,
nursing home residents would be allowed to retain $30,000 in assets
over and above the value of the homestead, with couples getting an
asset allowance of $60,000.86
Some legislators and policy-makers believe that tax incentives,
82. Charles P. Sabatino & Christopher D. Rolle, CCRCs and Assisted Living: Coun-
selling Prospective Residents, Proceedings 1991 NAELA Symposium # 11, at 1 (estimat-
ing that there are 700 CCRCs nationwide).
83. Sen. Rockefeller, Rep. Waxman To Introduce Bills Based On Pepper Commission
Proposal, 18 BNA PENSION REPORTER No. 21, May 27, 1991, at 910-11.
84. See Pepper Commission's Final Recommendations Issued Medicare/Medicaid
Guide (CCH) Last Report Letter #632, at 2-3 (Oct. 4, 1990).
85. Id. The test for disability includes either limitations in three out of the five Activi-
ties of Daily Living; a cognitive impairment that mandates constant supervision; or dan-
gerous or disruptive behavior that mandates constant supervision.
86. Id. Although current Medicaid rules do permit states to grant spousal resource
allowance of up to $60,000 (adjusted for inflation), the $30,000 resource allowance for
single people greatly exceeds current standards.
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rather than direct government funding, are preferable. Favored tax
status could be granted to "Individual Medical Accounts,"
("IMAs"), which, like IRAs, are intended to increase the savings rate
in the United States by inducing taxpayers to open special accounts.
Under the system, the appreciation on the IMA would be tax-deferred
until withdrawals were made to finance medical care. Other propos-
als call for a tax deduction for contributions made to the IMA. Many
of these proposals were made before 1986, when deductibility of con-
ventional IRA contributions was severely limited. Responding to this
proposal, commentators point out that funding long-term care would
require substantial annual IMA contributions.8 7 Assuming a low rate
of inflation, a 30-year-old saver would have to put more than $600 in
the IMA each year to fund 22 years of nursing home care. With a
higher inflation rate, the saver might have to make IMA contributions
in excess $1,000 a year.8"
Another proposal is "Social Health Maintenance Organizations"
("S/HMOs"), now the subject of small demonstration projects.8 9 A
S/HMO expands the standard HMO to include a program of long-
term care and nursing home services in addition to the acute care
services already provided by the traditional HMO. As a result, a S/
HMO participant could receive care through the same organization
throughout his or her life.
Under one proposal, a S/HMO member would pay monthly premi-
ums, plus co-payments for certain services.90 Like other LTC poli-
cies, the fiscal health of the plan would be threatened by an "adverse
selection" process. Joining a S/HMO is a voluntary decision, based
on a belief that the S/HMO offers the best available investment of the
health care dollar.9' A S/HMO would be most attractive to people
who believe that they are likely to need home care or nursing home
services, and least attractive to people who believe they will not need
such care, therefore overall costs are likely to be inflated.
Several strategies have been proposed to limit adverse selection.
For example, the enrollment materials for S/HMOs could downplay
87. RIVLIN & WIENER, supra note 69, at 112.
88. Id.
89. The Deficit Reduction and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984), included provisions for four S/HMO demonstration
projects; one each in New York, Oregon, Minnesota, and California. The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 101 Stat. 1330-268 (1987) ex-
tended the funding of the demonstration project until 1992.
90. In the four DEFRA demonstration S/HMOs, 10-20% copayments were required
for home care services.
91. For a discussion of adverse selection, see EBRI, supra note 2, at 12-13; RIVLIN &
WIENER, supra note 69, at 101-02.
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the availability of long-term care. 92 However, state disclosure statutes
might require a full explanation of all services offered by the plan, and
advocacy organizations for the elderly would similarly inform their
members of a new source of long-term care. The demonstration S/
HMO projects, which are subject to regulation by the Health Care
Financing Administration ("HCFA"), are allowed to limit the per-
centage of their enrollment subject to existing disabilities-but this
would probably not be permitted in a broadly marketed plan because
of the competitive nature of the current insurance market. To attract
enrollment and premiums, S/HMOs must highlight their distinctive
features, while attempting to control the number of disabled
members.
Several states have adopted Public/Private Initiative programs,
which are at various stages of planning and implementation, to en-
courage the purchase and use of private long-term care insurance.93
Already in operation, Indiana's program offers citizens who have ade-
quate private insurance the ability to obtain Medicaid coverage with-
out depletion of assets, and without the need to make transfers to
qualify for Medicaid.94 The program, which is administered by the
state's Department of Health, requires interested senior citizens to ap-
ply to the Department and receive counseling about the availability of
Medicare benefits and private LTC insurance. If these individuals
buy and maintain LTC insurance that provides at least a year of bene-
fits, and if they do become institutionalized but encounter nursing
home costs that are not reimbursed by insurance, they will automati-
cally be granted Medicaid benefits for the non-reimbursed care, re-
gardless of their income, assets, or transfers.
The development of public/private programs is not an entirely new
concept. Since 1987, eight states have been given grants to create
these systems intended to serve as a model for a nationwide pro-
gram.95 Connecticut was the first state to bring a program to the test-
ing stage.96 Another grantee state, New York, is in the process of
92. See RIVLIN & WIENER, supra note 69, at 101-02.
93. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 12-1-25-3-7.6 (Bums Supp. 1991).
94. Id. at § 12-1-25-5-7.6.
95. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
96. See Matthew Schwartz, Conn. LTC Plan Called 1st In nation, THE NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER COMPANY; LIFE & HEALTH/FINANCIAL SERVICES EDITION, September
9, 1991, at 3; Editorial Comment, Connecticut's LTC Crucible, THE NATIONAL UNDER-
WRITER COMPANY; LIFE & HEALTH/FINANCIAL SERVICES EDITION, September 16,
1991, at 18. The program, "The Connecticut Partnership," insulates, for Medicaid pur-
poses, assets equal to their LTC coverage: that is, $50,000 in insurance would render
$50,000 in assets Medicaid-exempt. See also Kirk Johnson, Connecticut to Sponsor Nurs-
ing Home Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991, at Al.
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developing a demonstration project for the sale of state-approved pri-
vate LTC policies. It was anticipated that New York would sell its
first policies in early 1991, but implementation was delayed.97
Programs that enhance the attractiveness of private LTC insurance
are an important step toward protecting the middle class against im-
poverishment when long-term care is required. The securities plan
would be an excellent complement to these programs. By providing a
competing system, a consumer would be given a choice between insur-
ance and securities funding that could act as a check on insurance
premiums, and would build flexibility into the existing system by al-
lowing consumers to combine the two according to personal finances,
investment strategies, and beliefs about the personal risk of institu-
tionalization or need for extensive home care.
III. The Proposed Securities Plan
This Article proposes a new funding mechanism that will rely upon
the private sector and virtually eliminate the need for government
funding for those who use it. The proposed system will utilize propri-
etary for-profit providers of long-term care and suggest that they com-
bine voluntarily into a consortium. Once formed, the consortium
would issue securities to the public that would be used by consortium
members to solve the current funding system's inability to provide
adequate care.
97. Under the projected plan, participants will be Medicaid-eligible once the policy
benefits are exhausted and will be responsible for a copayment, but will be Medicaid-
eligible regardless of asset level or transfers made during what would otherwise be the
penalty period before nursing home admission.
It is estimated that the annual premium for the guaranteed-renewable, state-approved
policy, purchased at age 65, will fall between $1,200-$1,500 range, depending on the op-
tions and riders chosen. If the policy is purchased at a younger age, the premiums will be
less expensive. In addition, the policies will be subject to state-mandated minimum re-
quirements.The requirements include the following:
No prior hospitalization or step-down requirement
Uniform eligibility requirements with other state-approved policies
A minimum loss ratio (i.e., the insurer must pay out at least a certain percentage of the
premiums it receives in the form of benefits)
No exclusion of Alzheimer's Disease or other dementias
Home care coverage, with a minimum benefit of $50 per day; nursing home coverage
with a minimum benefit of $100 per day
A benefit period of at least six years of home care, three years of institutional care, or
some combination of the two
For home care patients, respite care must be provided for the family or other unpaid care
giver.
See NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, [AFFORDABLE FINANCING
FOR LONG-TERM CARE] (INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS).
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A. How the Plan Works
A consortium of proprietary providers of long-term care could
solve many of the problems faced by health care providers and their
patients. In forming this consortium several factors should be consid-
ered, including the selection of the securities and products which
would be issued.
1. Formation, Structure and Operation of the Consortium
The first step in the plan would be the organization of the consor-
tium. Prospective members would sign a contract detailing their
rights to receive funds from the consortium and setting forth their
obligations to provide care meeting high quality and objective stan-
dards, in exchange for the surrender of securities.
Membership would be open on a voluntary basis, both to small fa-
cilities with a few beds and to large facilities operated by nationwide
chains. The consortium should include as many nationwide care
providers as possible so that security holders have a wide choice of
facilities which vary by geographic location, type of facility, religious
affiliation, and other characteristics. Nationwide participation is par-
ticularly important to reassure the consumer that shares purchased in
Wisconsin would still be usable for retirement in a "sunbelt" state.
Since about three-quarters of nursing homes in the United States are
proprietary, 98 there should be a broad choice available in most geo-
graphic regions to meet this concern.
Other considerations should be addressed in identifying the consor-
tium's membership criteria. For example, membership should be
open without discrimination provided that interested facilities meet
state licensing requirements. To ensure continued compliance with
these requirements, the membership agreement should provide for ex-
pulsion of members who lose their operating license, and perhaps for
censure (and fines payable to the consortium) for members who re-
ceive sanctions for poor performance. The consortium could also en-
sure a minimum uniform performance standard by requiring all
consortium members to meet the standards set by Medicare and
Medicaid, even if a facility did not seek certification by these
programs.
To document and define its membership, the consortium should
draft a "membership agreement" for participating facilities, which
would not only regulate the relationship of members within the con-
sortium, but would also satisfy public and regulatory demands for
98. See supra note 27.
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quality assurance in participating facilities.99 Vital terms would in-
clude: (1) membership qualifications; (2) the extent to which all mem-
bers will share in the costs of the initial public offering of securities
and any subsequent offerings; l"° (3) provisions for facilities to join the
consortium after it begins operations, as well as provisions for quitting
the consortium;1"' (4) an arbitration mechanism under which resi-
dents or their families could bring complaints about the quality of
care in participating facilities; 11 2 and (5) provisions for access to a
non-compulsory central purchasing system. 103
Once membership concerns have been addressed and identified, the
consortium would make an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of securities
to the public. This function of the consortium represents the essence
of the proposed financing plan - that investors must be assured of a
store of value. In order to meet this objective, the securities must be
completely fungible and completely marketable, which in turn man-
dates registration. 104 While there are some scenarios under which se-
curities are exempt from registration,'0 5 this discussion assumes that
99. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
100. It seems most equitable to calculate cost-sharing based on a member's market
share before joining the consortium.
101. The agreement must specify the extent to which existing members must provide
refunds of money already received. Perhaps most critically, it should outline the consor-
tium's responsibilities toward those who have already used securities to obtain residence
at the facility and wish to leave the consortium.
102. The use of arbitration could be attractive to the nursing home industry. Many
industries have willingly adopted self-regulation, regarding it as a better alternative to
enhanced government regulation. Nonetheless, the consortium would have to develop a
means to ensure objectivity in the course of arbitration proceedings. One possible solu-
tion is to mandate inclusion of consumer representatives, as well as representatives of
advocacy organizations, on the arbitration panels.
103. This membership feature would allow a "mom and pop" facility that needs two
cases of a particular supply to share in some of the cost savings. To avoid accusations of
the "tying" forbidden by antitrust laws, the central purchasing system should stock vari-
ous brands of a particular commodity, and should respond to members' requests for par-
ticular brands, rather than selecting a single brand. Furthermore, members must be
permitted to purchase as much or as little as they like of any item or any mix of items.
The price structure for purchsing supplies must be based strictly on the size of individual
order.
104. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). For purposes of registra-
tion, federal law defines the term "security" quite broadly. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l).
105. See, e.g., Securities Act § 3(a)(3) (exempting short-term commercial paper); Se-
curities Act § 3(a)(2) (exempting securities issued or guaranteed by government instru-
mentalities); Securities Act § 3(a)(l 1) (exempting issues limited to one state). 15 U.S.C
§ 77c. This latter exemption clearly will not apply because the consortium plan depends
on its nationwide scope. Similarly, § 3(b) of the Securities Act and its implementing
Regulations A and D permit small issues of securities to be made without registration,
but the consortium plan would require a larger issue. 15 U.S.C. § 77c; 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.251-.262, 230.501-.703(T) (1990). Finally, § 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts
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the securities issued by the consortium would be registered.1 6
The differing investment and care needs of potential purchasers
mandate that more than one type of security be offered. In light of
this need for diversity, the consortium should offer three types of se-
curities: 0 7 annuities,'08 common stock, 10 9 and zero-coupon bonds. "10
These securities should be issued with the consortium itself as the is-
suer and registrant."' The distinctive feature of the consortium se-
curities is that each would contain a "put" provision, enabling the
deals which do not involve any public offering. 15 U.S.C. § 77d. The consortium offering
would emphatically be public and would preclude a 4(2) exemption.
106. The registration requirement exacerbates the already lengthy, complex, and ex-
pensive process of making an IPO for a single corporation. For instance, the focus of
securities registration is financial disclosure; however, before the IPO, the consortium
would have no significant financial assets, no past financial statements to be disclosed,
and no track record. Other problems, such as routine SEC reporting requirements and
disclosures to security owners, would develop once the securities were issued.
The logical solution would be to require disclosure not of the consortium's financial
affairs, but of the nursing home industry as a whole, making the consortium a kind of
"pass-through" entity with administrative but not operating functions. In effect, then,
the securities would be guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the nursing home indus-
try. Although it is quite plausible that a particular facility might go out of business or
become insolvent, it is hard to imagine that all nursing homes would do so simultane-
ously.
Another interesting issue is whether, in addition to the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act, and the normal Blue Sky process, the consortium securities would be
subject to additional disclosure requirements that many states impose on Continuing
Care Retirement Communities. This problem could be addressed by including a provi-
sion in the consortium contract to the effect that all participating facilities must submit
current disclosure documents to the consortium and then by including a provision in the
prospectus to the effect that disclosure documents for all participating facilities are avail-
able on request from the consortium.
107. See discussion infra part III.A.2.
108. Under § 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act, some insurance and annuity contracts is-
sued by companies subject to state banking or insurance regulation are exempt from re-
gistration. 15 U.S.C. § 77c. An exemption under this section might be available for
consortium annuities, but it seems more practical to register all consortium securities
rather than encounter state insurance regulation.
109. Registration of stock and annuities would probably have to be made on the SEC's
"long form" registration statement, Form S-1. Shorter registration forms are available
for issuers with a "track record," but a new issuer or an issuer that has not been subject
to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for at least three
years must use Form S-1.
110. It is assumed that zero-coupon bonds would be subject to the Trust Indenture Act
and registered as such. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1988).
111. See John D'Alimonte, Underwriting Documents: Their Purpose and Content, in
MECHANICS OF UNDERWRITING 1989, at 99-100 (Practicing Law Institute, Corporate
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series #656 (1989)).
In acting as the issuer, the consortium must furnish each purchaser with a prospectus
as required by the Securities and Trust Indenture Acts. It would be helpful to purchasers
to draft the prospectus in a manner that also conforms to federal and state consumer
protection regulations and regulation of LTC insurance and Medicare.
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security holder to surrender the security in exchange for LTC at the
consortium facility of the security holder's choice. Although pricing
issues would have to be resolved, the initial proposal contemplates
that ownership of one share of stock would entitle the holder to one
month of care. As for the other securities, a zero-coupon bond could
be redeemed at a certain date for $25,000 in cash or $25,000 worth of
care (and could be sold on the secondary market at any time before
that date). Similarly, an annuity would promise payments of $600 a
month in cash or $600 worth of care, for example, starting on a cer-
tain date.
A successful IPO would raise millions of dollars. It is recom-
mended that a portion of the proceeds be distributed immediately to
consortium members in proportion to their market share or invest-
ment before implementation of the plan. The consortium should also
make annual distributions of investment income based on the propor-
tion of securities actually redeemed at a particular facility. That is,
the more stockholders, bondholders, and annuitants that the facility
could induce to become residents in that facility, the more income the
facility would receive from the consortium.
In the first few years of consortium operation, few redemption pay-
ments would be made because there would not be many stockholders
redeeming their securities. Thus, the consortium would have a large
pool of capital which would then be made available for borrowing by
the members, at competitive or perhaps below-market rates, in order
to construct new facilities or upgrade physical plant or staffing in ex-
isting facilities. This continued access to immediate payments usable
for facility operations would be one incentive for facilities to join the
consortium.
The remainder of the proceeds would be retained by the consor-
tium. These funds, and the corresponding investment income, could
operate as a revolving loan fund within the industry. Each year a
distribution could be made to consortium members, in proportion to
the extent to which security holders actually "put" their securities to
the facility. Facilities that attracted a larger number of security hold-
ers to use their securities for care in those facilities would be entitled
to more money. In this regard the plan would be pro-competitive,
providing an incentive for facilities to engage in active competition in
quality to convince security holders to select their facility.
Security holders would not be required to surrender their full com-
plement of securities when they enter a consortium facility. The typi-
cal entrant could pay a month at a time, or a few months in advance.
If the entrant is dissatisfied with a facility, she could simply leave, and
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use her remaining securities in exchange for care in another partici-
pating facility. Although transfer trauma1 2 still poses a risk, the
problem is less severe when the residents have more control over their
placement.II3 Most importantly, the transfer will be at the instance of
the resident who will have a full menu of choices available.
Once the IPO of consortium securities is launched, the next ques-
tion is whether the IPO will succeed in the market. The criteria for a
successful IPO have been described in the following way:
In addition to meeting certain financial guidelines, a high quality
initial public offering candidate should possess some proprietary
capability or technology, be a member of a growing and viable in-
dustry, have good relationships with both customers and suppliers,
and have a competent management team.' 14
Although the proposed consortium has neither proprietary capabil-
ity nor technology, it would be the only organization offering securi-
ties for nursing home care. In addition, demographics indicate that
the nursing home industry is likely to expand as the size of the elderly
population increases.
An additional question remains as to who would invest in the se-
curities offered by the consortium. Although this hypothesis must be
tested by the market, middle-class people who are already securities
investors might perceive the advantages of buying the consortium's
securities. In addition, the securities would be an attractive invest-
ment for mutual funds that specialize in socially progressive issues.
They would also appeal to union pension funds, because retirement
security, including post-retirement health benefits, is a major concern
of these funds. In a climate in which employers are seeking to reduce
employee and retiree health benefits, the availability of an investment
that promotes better health care for union retirees would probably
have a broad constituency. In contrast, the securities probably would
not be attractive to risk arbitrageurs because the reciprocal relation-
112. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
113. Many nursing home residents, of course, are mentally incapacitated and cannot
make choices about their own care. It might be useful for state conservatorship and
guardianship statutes to be amended to specify that fiduciaries can properly invest in
consortium securities, and that the fiduciary has the same power over the securities as the
protected person would have if he or she were not incapacitated - powers including
doling out the securities one month at a time, selling securities and applying proceeds in
the best interests of the protracted person, and moving the protected person to a better
facility.
114. Addison M. Levi, III, Preparing for an Initial Public Offering, in How TO PRE-
PARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 95, 100 (Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law
Practice Course Handbook Series #656 (1989)).
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ship between private-pay fees paid in cash and the securities would set
* an upper limit on the securities' potential appreciation.
In principle, the consortium could be organized in several forms: a
joint venture, a trade association, a not-for-profit corporation, or a
for-profit corporation. Issuing stock is a corporate attribute, which
seems to rule out the feasibility of the joint venture structure. In a
sense, the consortium's objectives are similar to those for which many
not-for-profit organizations are set up, such as operation of health
care facilities and provision of care for the elderly. Nevertheless, the
consortium would provide private profit opportunities to the owners
of participating facilities, ruling out the use of a not-for-profit
corporation.
In some ways, the proposed consortium resembles the "business
league," a type of not-for-profit corporation organized under Internal
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(6),'" and distinct from the 501(c)(3)
charitable organization. 116 Consortium members would have the req-
uisite common business interest as providers of long-term care for the
elderly. The consortium's activities would be directed toward im-
proving conditions in one or more lines of business and improving
nursing home care for the elderly. The Code forbids business leagues
from carrying on a business that is ordinarily done for profit, but
there is no existing profit-making business that channels capital to
nursing homes. Nevertheless, the consortium's intended result of net
income inuring to private shareholders or individuals would preclude
501(c)(6) treatment.
The producer's or consumer's cooperative is another structure that
provides a somewhat useful analogy for determining what the tax sta-
tus of consortium securities may be. The cooperative association, as
recognized by the laws of many states, permits an association and its
members to enter into an arrangement under which producers market
their products, or consumers satisfy their purchasing needs, through
the cooperative. Typical hallmarks of the cooperative include voting
power for all its members; levying of assessments for shared purposes
such as "image" advertising and management of the cooperative; and
the distribution of economic benefits (sales proceeds, cost savings) to
members either equally or on the basis of utilization. Properly consti-
tuted cooperatives are exempt from antitrust attack and dictum in
115. See generally Jerald A. Jacobs, Association Law Handbook (Bureau of National
Affairs, Washington, D.C. 1986); Howard L. Oleck, Non-profit Corporations, Organiza-
tions and Associations 938-49 (5th ed., 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
116. See Lynn Stevens Hume, IRS Clarifies Policy on Granting 501(c)(3) Status to
Nonprofit Health Care Entities, THE BOND BUYER, August 5, 1991, at 2.
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several cases suggests that the cooperative form is favored by the
law. 1
17
Because the consortium's objectives include enhancing a nursing
home's image and improving the quality of care to attract private-pay
patients, the consortium bears certain resemblances to the producer's
cooperative model. In both the cooperative and the consortium,
members would probably have to pay some type of assessment to
cover administrative costs, especially in the early years of operation
before the IPO proceeds have accumulated. Typically, producers
who participate in a cooperative agree to give the cooperative exclu-
sive marketing rights for their product. In this instance, consortium
members would want to retain the right to attract private-pay patients
who do not own consortium securities. Similarly, Medicare and
Medicaid certified facilities would want the option of servicing pa-
tients whose care is paid for by public benefit programs.
Despite the desirable attributes of the cooperative and joint venture
forums, the ordinary business corporation, which allows the most
flexibility in issuing securities, presents the most feasible
alternative. 11
2. Selection of Securities and Products
Because the elderly are not a homogeneous group, the proposed
plan should offer a variety of securities to accommodate the types of
care required by the elderly population. I 9 By offering common stock,
zero-coupon bonds, and annuities, the consortium is most likely to
meet the needs of consumers.
The initial attraction of common stock is that single shares would
probably trade at low enough prices to permit young and middle-aged
people to buy at least one share a year and accumulate shares for
future need. An additional advantage is that a securities market and
the private pay nursing home rate would act as reciprocal checks on
one another. In this way, an individual would pay no more than the
discounted present value of anticipated future care for consortium se-
117. See Eric Mayer, Cooperative Associations, 18 AM. JUR. 2d 271-321 (1985 & Supp.
1990).
118. Because the consortium would have hundreds of stockholders, many of them cor-
porations, a C Corporation would be most appropriate and an S Corporation election
would be precluded. In selecting an incorporation state, the criteria of low taxes and
favorable treatment must be balanced against other costs of doing business including
rents and utility rates and. convenience of communication with consortium members.
119. As stated several times throughout this Article, some members of the elderly pop-
ulation are completely healthy while others are completely debilitated. In addition, finan-
cial resources and systems of family and community support vary greatly.
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curities, based on an assessment of the risk of needing LTC in the
future, because of the assurance that the same care could be obtained
for a smaller sum in cash. Similarly, no one would pay $5,000 in cash
for a month's worth of care if securities could be purchased on the
open market for a lesser amount and then exchanged for the same
care.
A common stock component is also attractive because corporate
democracy gives rights to stockholders which help protect consumers.
For example, stockholders can vote for the corporation's board of di-
rectors and, to a limited extent, place proposals on the corporate
agenda for stockholder vote. Stockholders are also entitled to exten-
sive disclosure through the corporation's annual and quarterly re-
ports. Thus, a stockholder who expects to move into a nursing home
at some time in the future will have every right, and significant incen-
tive, to visit the facility to see that residents are well-fed and are re-
ceiving adequate care. Ideally, younger stockholders will act as
advocates for elderly residents of consortium facilities and press for
improvements in the quality of care.
The proposed plan calls for zero-coupon bonds as a complement to
the common stock. The zero-coupon bond would be redeemable at
maturity, either in cash (directly from the consortium) or in the
equivalent amount of care provided by a participating facility of the
bondholder's choice.1 20 For instance, it might be possible to purchase
a bond with a face value of $30,000, with a fifteen year maturity, for
about $10,000, depending on prevailing interest rates, the bond rating,
and other financial factors. At maturity, the owner would receive the
$30,000 in either cash or care through the bond's sale on the secon-
dary market.
At first glance, it seems that an enormous variety of denominations
and maturities would be required to fit the varying needs of purchas-
ers. In practice only a few maturities, such as five, ten, fifteen, and
twenty-year bonds, would suffice. The inclusion of stocks as well as
bonds would be important because both securities offer a different risk
structure. The stock, exchangeable for a month of care per share,
effectively shifts some of the risk of cost increases to the facility, be-
cause a facility would be constrained from "charging" more than one
share for a month's care. Regional cost differences might create a
problem because the same share could not be exchanged on the same
terms in high-cost and low-cost areas of the country.
120. Conventional "coupon" bonds are not included because the intention is to mini-
mize the transfer of cash from the consortium to the public, in favor of maximizing the
provision of nursing home services in exchange for securities.
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Offering consortium stocks in conjunction with bonds has other ad-
vantages. It would allow the investor to choose the amount he or she
wishes to invest, and the degree and type of risk that would be desira-
ble for a particular purchaser. The intention is that both stocks and
bonds would appeal primarily to middle-aged investors, who want to
make a long-range plan for their own care or contribute to the cost of
a parent's care, and who look to appreciation in stock prices and the
built-in appreciation inherent in zero-coupon bonds to provide such
care at a deep discount.
While it is arguable that stocks and bonds would be less attractive
to the elderly investor, there may be ways to avoid this problem. For
example, granting preferential Medicaid treatment, and thereby mak-
ing it easier to qualify for Medicaid, could make these securities more
attractive.'12 If a Medicaid applicant owned securities, the securities
would be a countable asset that ordinarily would impair Medicaid-
eligibility; however, it would be in the interests of both the state and
federal governments to amend the Social Security Act (and its accom-
panying Medicaid regulations) to permit consortium securities to be
spent-down, without Medicaid penalty, before other assets were used.
Eligibility for Medicaid benefits depends on asset level, on income,
and on whether non-exempt transfers have been made once a penalty
period has started to run. A financial transaction constitutes a trans-
fer for Medicaid purposes only if it is gratuitous. A purchase for full
market value is not a transfer and cannot trigger a penalty period.
Because nursing home residents remain private-pay patients and defer
their Medicaid application, the state and federal government will have
to shoulder fewer months of care.
Typically, the elderly investor, who is already at risk of institution-
alization in the near future, would not be attracted by the relatively
insignificant short-term discount offered by purchasing a bond. Nev-
ertheless, it is likely that the stocks and bonds would be attractive to a
conservator or guardian faced with the likelihood of placing the pro-
tected person in a nursing home. Similarly, stocks and bonds would
also appeal to a person who fears his or her own future incapacity,
and wishes to take steps to ensure the availability of institutional care.
In addition to stocks and bonds, an annuity 22 would be potentially
attractive to a different niche of the elderly population. Offering an
annuity component in the plan would accommodate the older inves-
121. States such as Indiana provide incentives for their citizens to maintain LTC insur-
ance, by liberalizing Medicaid requirements for citizens who maintain at least a minimum
of private insurance.
122. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 72 & 101 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
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tor who would be likely to have a lump sum to invest, whether it be a
lump-sum pension payout,'23 IRA or Keogh fund, or proceeds from
the sale of a family home or insurance. An annuity component would
permit elderly investors with a large sum to invest with the expecta-
tion of receiving continuing income, "backstopped" by the promise of
receiving long-term care of equivalent value if the annuitant requires
institutionalization.
Older investors often favor annuity investments for additional rea-
sons. In planning, they avoid having to manage a large sum of money
and receive safe, regular income. From a tax perspective, the Internal
Revenue Service provides favorable treatment for deferred annui-
ties. 124 For money invested in a deferred annuity, the appreciation in
value of the annuity is not taxed until the owner begins to receive
regular payments. 25 Thus, the consortium could provide annuities
for middle-aged and older investors who seek regular income. Annui-
ties tailored to produce no more than the amount of income that can
be retained by a Medicaid applicant and his or her spouse would be
especially attractive in elder care planning. 126
The annuity, like the bond, contains a factor of price risk. The fact
that the monthly annuity payment may represent far less than the
total cost of care should be emphasized in the prospectus and stressed
by elder law attorneys and financial planners. By combining annuity
123. Elder law attorneys often advise clients who have this option to take their pen-
sions in lump-sum rather than annuity form because Medicaid plans can be made to
transfer part of the lump sum, or to transmute it into exempt assets (e.g., by buying a
home, selling the homestead and buying a more expensive one, doing home repairs or
making capital improvements that make the home more suitable for a disabled elderly
resident.) There are no comparable planning possibilities for excess income deriving from
annuity payments. Pensions cannot be anticipated; the recipient cannot assign future
pension payments. Furthermore, although some of the states allow "income spend-
down" - permitting Medicaid applicants whose income exceeds the limit to qualify for
Medicaid by proving that they have spent the excess on Medicaid care - still others do
not allow this option. Thus, applicants with excess income remain ineligible for Medicaid
even if they devote their income to medical bills.
124. See I.R.C. § 72.
125. This favorable tax treatment is available only if annuity payments are delayed at
least until the investor reaches age 59 1/2, which explains why older investors favor
annuity investment. By contrast, younger investors seldom have the patience to wait
twenty or thirty years before receiving annuity payments.
126. The attractiveness of this option would be enhanced in states such as Florida and
New Jersey that disqualify Medicaid applicants if their income exceeds the limit.
Purchase of such an annuity would convert excess assets into permissible income, and
would not constitute a transfer giving rise to a penalty period because there is no gratui-
tous element. The strategy of combining consortium securities with Medicaid planning
might be used by a person unable to afford enough securities to fully fund LTC, but with
an asset level too high to qualify for Medicaid without some form of planning or spend-
down.
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purchases with a balanced investment program, the risk could be
brought within tolerable limits.
With any security, no guarantee exists that a profit would be real-
ized and it is unlikely that the securities would become worthless
through bankruptcy. The full faith and credit of all consortium mem-
bers, who might represent a large portion of the entire nursing home
industry, not the credit of one nursing home or nursing home opera-
tor, would support the consortium's securities. If a particular facility
went out of business, securities could still be redeemed at other facili-
ties. In contrast, LTC insurance contains a significant risk that the
purchaser of an LTC insurance policy will, in effect, surrender all in-
surance premiums and never collect any benefits. This is indeed true
of other forms of insurance - for example, a homeowner who never
suffers a fire never collects benefits from fire insurance - but LTC
insurance premiums are often high enough to deter potential purchas-
ers who are aware of this risk. For these potential purchasers, the
securities plan offers reassurance.
C. Drafting Guidelines from College Savings Plans
While the proposed consortium would be entirely new in the health
care field, a number of states have already enacted securities funding
programs for higher education. This section will discuss how these
programs have succeeded in uniting public and private providers and
in issuing securities in order to assist families with the challenge of
financing higher education.127 While these programs are fairly new
and it is too early to assess their success, they provide insight into the
viability of a large scale securities plan similar to the proposed
consortium.
The analogy between college savings plans and nursing home fi-
nancing is not 'perfect. A college education is a much-desired out-
come, whereas institutionalization is not an aspiration. The offspring
of education-oriented families will usually go to college and enroll-
ment will usually take place between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
five, typically over a period of four years. In contrast, only a fraction
of the elderly population will enter a nursing home.' 28 Another criti-
cal difference is that college planning is usually done by parents for
127. See generally Peter Barton, Paying for Your Child's College Education with New,
Double Tax-Free Government Bonds, 62 Wis. L. REV. 19 (1989); Douglas K. Chapman &'
Roger W. Anderson, Ohio's College Savings Plan: Buyer Beware, 21 U. OF TOLEDO L.
REV. 131 (1989); David Williams II, Financing a College Education: A Taxing Dilemma,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 561 (1989);
128. See supra note 13. Both the age at entry and the length of stay are unpredictable.
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their children, while long-term care planning must be done by indi-
viduals for themselves, with the funds remaining after other family
needs have been met. A high proportion of nursing home residents
are widowed, divorced, or never married. 12 9 Many of these residents
seldom receive visitors and are unlikely to receive substantial financial
support from relatives.
In spite of these differences, the approaches that have evolved in
response to the parental challenge of providing college tuition for one
or more children are still informative. Many states have enacted col-
lege savings plans modeled after either the "Michigan Plan"' 30 or the
"Illinois Plan."' 131 An initial comparison of the two plans is necessary
for the purposes of analysis. In the Michigan Plan, a family pre-pays
tuition in advance at a discount, while the Illinois Plan tackles the
problem by issuing college savings bonds.
In Michigan, the Michigan Education Trust administers the plan
under the auspices of the board of trustees and includes a representa-
tive of Michigan's colleges as well as various government appointees.
Under the plan, individuals can buy a contract priced in accordance
with how long in advance it is purchased-the longer the term, the
lower the contract price. The contract obligates the state of Michigan
to pay the full tuition and fees for a "qualified beneficiary," typically,
the payor's child. To create an incentive to purchase such contracts,
the state makes the purchase price, payable in a lump sum or in in-
stallments, deductible on state income tax returns. The Michigan
statute spells out the conditions on which refunds will be available,
and whether interest will be paid on refunded moneys.
The Michigan Plan has been in operation only since the summer of
1988, so it is hard to tell how successful it will be either from the point
of view of the parents of college students or the state operating the
trust. A recent article criticizes the validity of the trust's actuarial
129. GAO I, supra note 2, at 35 ("In 1985, only 16% of the elderly entering nursing
homes were married.").
130. MicH. CoMp. LAWS § 390.1421-.1444 (West 1988). Also adopted in: FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 240.439-.498 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); IND. STAT. ANN. § 21-8-6-1 to -16
(West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 12601-12619 (West Supp. 1990); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 166.207-.260 (Vernon 1991); WYO. STAT. § 21-16-501 to -505 (Supp.
1991).
131. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 144, para. 2401-11 (1986 & Supp. 1991). Something similar
also exists in: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-15-110.5 (West 1990 & Supp. 1990-91);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10A-221 to -245 (1982 & Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 262A.6A (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 360.046 (Vernon Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 116-209 (1987); OHlO REV. CODE ANN. § 3334.01-.12 (Anderson 1990); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 35-15-1 to -6 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-901 to -907 (1990); VA.
CODE ANN. § 23-38.72-.74 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28B.106.005-.902 (Supp. 1991); 1989 WiS. LAWS 68.
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assumptions, federal income tax status, and price setting mechanism
for participation.' 32 Nevertheless, in 1989, the Hemar Corporation
modeled a private-sector education financing plan after the Michigan
Plan 33 and a handful of colleges currently offer guaranteed tuition
programs similar to the Michigan Plan.'34
Compared to the Michigan Plan, the Illinois plan relies heavily on
private sector securities financing. Under Illinois' "Baccalaureate
Savings Act,"' 35 the state issues triple-tax-exempt (federal, state, and
local) zero-coupon bonds.' 36 The interest rate on the bonds is set one-
half percent higher if the bonds are redeemed for higher education
purposes within the state, but there is no limitation on the use of the
proceeds. Furthermore, the first $25,000 of bond principal and inter-
est is excluded from the determination of the student's financial-aid
eligibility.
Following these initiatives, in September, 1989, Wisconsin adopted
an enabling statute under which the Building Commission could sell
132. Jeffrey S. Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions, and Wealth Re-
distribution: Lessons About Public Policy from a Prepaid Tuition Policy, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1035 (1990). Lehman notes that, in the first year of program operation, $6800 was
charged to guarantee four years of tuition to a newborn infant; $9200 for a child entering
tenth grade in the fall of 1988. Although registration fees were paid to reserve a place in
the program for 82,000 children, only 39,000 contracts were actually purchased. Id. at
1044. Lehman quotes April, 1986 testimony by MET treasurer Robert Bowman before
the Michigan House of Representative's Colleges and Universities Committee: "This is a
middle-income plan. But once investments are made, middle-income families should not
need other scholarship monies as much, freeing these funds for poor families. Plus, the
state could consider investing a portion of the funds it already spends on scholarships and
grants into the program on behalf of the poorer students." Id. at 1060-61. If this argu-
ment is valid, it would operate even more strongly in favor of the securities plan: by
permitting middle-income individuals to make affordable provision for their own care, it
would free Medicaid funds for poorer people.
133. See David Williams, supra note 121, at 595 n.255. The Hemar plan has intriguing
similarities to the plan for LTC financing described in this article. Hemar, a close corpo-
ration, supplemented its original business of buying and servicing college loans by devel-
oping a program under which colleges nationwide could join in a plan under which
parents would purchase guaranteed tuition contracts redeemable at any participating
school, with provisions for refund if the offspring in question failed to attend a participat-
ing institution. Hemar needed SEC clearance and IRS advice before the plan could be
offered to the public.
134. These plans are limited to providing a discount on tuition at that specific institu-
tion, creating a problem if the student is unable to meet the admissions standards of the
institution, or prefers to seek instruction somewhere else. The problem of a single-institu-
tion limitation is somewhat alleviated by Indiana University's offering of guaranteed tui-
tion certificates redeemable at eight campuses to parents who are Indiana residents. In
addition, the certificates can also be sold on a secondary market, with two banks acting as
market-makers. Williams, supra note 121, at 595.
135. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2401-11 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
136. Christopher R. O'Dea, Illinois to Sell $90 Million Zero Coupon GO's Marketed as
College Bonds, T1E BOND BUYER, January 11, 1988, at 4.
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zero-coupon higher education bonds. 37 First sold in March, 1990,
the state used tax incentives to spur sales. Under federal law, the
bonds are tax free and under state law, the original issue discount on
the bonds is excluded from taxable income providing that the bonds
are purchased by an individual as opposed to a corporation or part-
nership.'3  The Wisconsin plan calls for non-callable bonds with va-
rying maturities of six to twenty years. The longer the maturity, the
lower the price of the bond. In other words, if the goal is to accumu-
late $X in principal and imputed interest, the longer the term of the
bond, the smaller the principal sum that need be invested to provide
the desired fund. The non-callable feature is important because, if the
bonds were callable, the issuer could redeem the bonds, depriving the
bond holders of the benefit of a favorable change in interest rates. To
a certain extent, parents can select a maturity in line with their chil-
dren's actual age and expected college entrance and can make selec-
tions by price, according to what they can afford.13 9
A third education based program, the Ohio Bond Program became
effective October 2, 1989.14° The program provides for the sale of
zero-coupon bonds with a $5,000 face value and a 15-year term. The
length of the term permits a deep discount, reducing the sale price to
approximately $1,200 per bond. The program also includes the sale
of two types of non-tax-exempt, "tuition credits" similar to the Michi-
gan contracts. One type of credit is redeemable at the educational
institution for tuition, the other type is paid directly to the student to
pay fees, dormitory costs, and related non-tuition costs. The credits
are sold in units whose denomination is one percent of the average
yearly tuition in state-assisted Ohio schools.'
The long maturity structure of these educational plans may pose a
practical limitation on their attractiveness to potential purchasers.
Not all parents have the resources or the inclination to plan two de-
cades ahead for a child's college education or for a projected off-
spring. To cope with this objection, the Illinois-type plan permits
137. See Williams, supra note 121; 1989 Wis. LAWS 68.
138. Original issue discount means the "interest" on the bonds is not paid periodically
in cash as it would be on an ordinary bond; instead, the bond is sold at a deep discount.
139. A longer maturity means a lower price. When the plan was designed, it was
projected that the initial issue of 20-year bonds would yield 6.95%, selling for $255.02 per
$1,000 face value (the maximum denomination permitted by the plan).
140. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3334.01-.12 (1989).
141. A legal question raised by the program, that has yet to be resolved, is who will be
the "owner" of the credits-the purchaser, who retains the right to change the beneficiary
of the credits, or the student on whose behalf tuition or other non-tuition-related expenses
are paid?
1991]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
colleges and other eligible post-secondary institutions 142 to redeem the
bonds prior to the maturity date-i.e., when the student is actually in
college. To accomplish this end, the college could credit the "ac-
creted value" of the bonds 4 3 to the bond holder's account. An ad-
vantage of not redeeming the securities for cash would be to create a
guarantee against a loss in value, that would insulate a bondholder
against inflation in post-secondary tuition.
Additional concerns have been raised regarding the significant de-
gree of interest rate risk inherent in making long-term financial com-
mitments.'" If the interest-rate climate is unfavorable to parent-
investors, the bond program will have to make concessions to over-
come an unwillingness to purchase bonds. From an equity perspec-
tive, the tuition plans, like the securities plan, are attractive to
potential middle-class investors, but have little or nothing to offer
low-income families. From an issuing state's perspective, excessive
returns could also threaten a bond program by leaving the state with
obligations it may be unable to afford.
Implementing the proposed securities plan in the health care indus-
try will raise a host of similar concerns. The tax questions raised in
conjunction with state education securities plans provide a basis for
analyzing the likely tax treatment for consortium securities and will
be discussed in the following section.
IV. The Legal Implications Of The Proposed Plan
The proposed consortium's implementation will raise a multitude
of complex legal issues. The first section will discuss tax considera-
tions that may affect a purchaser's decision to buy consortium securi-
ties. The second section explores why the proposed combination of
health care providers is unlikely to be vulnerable to antitrust chal-
lenge. Finally, the consortium's interaction with the highly regulated
nursing home industry will be considered. The focus will be on the
limitations Certificate of Need Laws may impose on the consortium's
construction of new facilities.
142. The definition of post-secondary institutions explicitly excludes proprietary trade
schools.
143. Accreted value of the bonds includes the original purchase price, plus an addi-
tional amount compounded semi-annually from the date of purchase, based on the yield
prevailing at the time of purchase.
144. See Williams, supra note 121, at 595 (quoting Richard E. Anderson of the Forum




When an attorney or other advisor makes a plan providing for
long-term care, it is important to choose the alternative that provides
the best results and lowest after-tax cost to the senior citizen. Ac-
cordingly, the tax status of the securities to individual purchasers
raises important questions, including what basis a purchased security
will have upon redemption and whether the securities will be entitled
to a tax preference. The health-care related nature of consortium se-
curities, as compared to securities purchased for conventional invest-
ment purposes, might entitle them to preferential tax treatment. Basis
rules and tax issues will affect the attractiveness of the consortium's
securities to a prospective purchaser who must compare the after-tax
return of consortium securities to other securities.
Tax preferences would reduce the effective tax rate that a security
holder would have to pay in redeeming consortium securities. A 1988
change in the Internal Revenue Code'45 extends a limited tax prefer-
ence to certain purchases of Series EE savings bonds. 4 6 Interest on
such bonds purchased after December 31, 1989 is excluded from in-
come if the bonds are redeemed in a year in which the purchaser in-
curs "qualified education expenses."' 47 The exclusion is not available
to grandparents, other relatives, or friends of the student, but is fully
available to parents with qualifying adjusted gross incomes. 48 A sim-
ple measure that would benefit the elderly would be to extend similar
tax benefits to individuals who redeem Series EE bonds for their own
long-term care.
Optimally, the same treatment would also be extended to consor-
tium securities, however this extension is less likely because of an IRS
ruling on the federal tax consequences of the. "Michigan Plan."' 49
The ruling provides that the purchase of the contract is not an event
subject to federal income tax. This implies that the consortium's se-
145. 26 U.S.C § 135 (1988) (added by Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
(TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100-647, tit. VI, § 6009(a), 102 Stat. 3688.
146. Series EE bonds are widely available, in small denominations, with no "load,"
and therefore are a suitable investment for families whose income level or lack of experi-
ence with financial services makes other investments unsuitable or undesirable. Consor-
tium securities might also fit these criteria.
147. Tuition and fees only; not dormitory bills or other expenses that replace ordinary
nondeductible living expenses for a dependent child.
148. See I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(A). Subject to certain modifications, adjusted gross income
must be less than $40,000 (for a single or head-of-household return) or $60,000 (for a
joint return); reduced for parental incomes between $40,000 and $55,000 (single or head-
of-household) and $60,000-$90,000 (joint return), and unavailable at higher income
levels. These figures are indexed for inflation.
149. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988).
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curities would fail to qualify for gift tax exemption status. 50 Further-
more, the ruling found the gift to be a completed one, indicating that
the purchase of a contract would deplete the purchaser's unified
credit.' 5
Under Private Letter Ruling 88-25-027, 52 when a student begins
college, the student realizes taxable income equal to the excess of the
fair market value of the educational services provided, over one-
fourth of the student's basis in the contract. Because the consortium
contemplates a contract's purchase far in advance at a deep discount,
tax gains would be significant in most cases.
While letter rulings lack the precedential value of case law and
while the consortium's objectives diverge from Michigan's education
program, application of the ruling to the proposed consortium would
discourage investors from purchasing the securities. A possible IRS
position would be to interpret the disposition of consortium securities
for health care as a barter transaction. In this interpretation, the se-
curity holder who exercises the put provision barters securities in ex-
change for long-term care.
Barter transactions receive rather unfavorable treatment because
the Code forces each party to realize a gain on the fair market value of
the item transferred rather than the excess of the fair market value of
the property received over that of the property surrendered.I53 If, for
instance, a sculptor and a furrier exchange a statue for a fur coat, each
of them has taxable income equivalent to the FMV of the property
received. Instead. if the fur-loving sculptor had sold 100 shares of
stock and used the cash to buy the coat, she would be taxed only on
the capital gain, the excess of the FMV over the basis of the stock.
The trade-off is that barter improves the taxpayer's cash flow,' 54 but
increases his or her tax bill.
Under current law, the basis of the consortium securities in the
150. Id. Under the ruling, because the payment was made to the Michigan Education
Trust, not directly to an educational institution as required by that Code Section, the gift
would also fail to qualify for exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C.
§ 2503(e)(2)(A).
151. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1988).
152. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988).
153. See I.R.C. § 61. Interestingly, the Internal Revenue Code deals explicitly with
the situation in which an employee or independent contractor receives securities in com-
pensation for his or her services, but gives little guidance as to what happens when a
recipient of services, such as health care, pays for them with securities.
154. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(6)(ii) (1960); Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60; Rev.
Rul. 83-163, 1983-2 C.B. 26. Desired goods or services can be paid for with property;
often property that the taxpayer would otherwise have trouble disposing of or would have
to sell at a loss.
[Vol. XIX
LONG-TERM CARE FUNDING
hands of their original purchaser would be the purchase price, subject
to any adjustment mandated or permitted by the Code. The basis of
inherited securities would be the fair market value at the time of the
decedent's death. 5 5 The computation is more complex for securities
that are the subject of gifts. For computing gain, the donee assumes
the donor's basis. For computing loss, the basis is either the donor's
basis or the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift,
whichever is lower.1
5 6
Consortium securities may raise other income tax issues. The Code
does not wait until redemption to tax the appreciation of the zero-
coupon bond. Instead, the Internal Revenue Code"57 taxes a bond-
holder on a proportionate share of the "original issue discount"
(OID), which in effect is a substitute for the taxable interest on a con-
ventional bond." 8 Consequently, the zero-coupon bonds included in
the securities plan would generate OID and thus taxable income.
The gain on disposition of a market discount bond attributable to
the discount constitutes ordinary interest income, not capital gain.
This distinction would make a practical difference with respect to
nursing home bonds purchased on the secondary market, not as part
of the original issue, if the Tax Code were amended to reinstate signif-
icant preferential tax rates on capital gains.
Another significant question is the status of consortium securities
vis-a-vis the medical expense deduction. 59 For life care communi-
155. I.R.C. § 1014 (1988). Somewhat similar considerations apply to the taxation of
income received under an annuity, including an annuity issued by the consortium. I.R.C.
§ 72 permits the taxpayer to retrieve the capital invested in the annuity tax-free. The
portion of each annuity payment that exceeds the "exclusion ratio," representing a return
of capital, constitutes taxable income. For taxable "coupon" bonds, the interest paid
periodically constitutes taxable income to the recipient. In the case of a "zero-coupon"
bond, no periodic interest payments are made, but the maturity value is much higher
than the bond's initial purchase price.
156. I.R.C. § 1015 (1988).
157. I.R.C. § 1273(b) (1988).
158. Under I.R.C. § 1272(a) (1988), certain amounts are not considered OID: the dis-
count on U.S. Savings Bonds or tax-exempt bonds; short-term obligations with a term
under one year; obligations created by natural persons no later than March 2, 1984; and
loans of less than $10,000 where both borrower and lender are natural persons, and there
is no tax-avoidance intent.
159. Under I.R.C. § 213, unreimbursed medical expenses are deductible to the extent
that they exceed 7.5% of an individuals adjusted gross income. Because a nursing home
resident lives in the nursing home, and a portion of the cost of institutionalization repre-
sents a substitute for ordinary living costs, no medical expense is available for a "rest
home" or other facility that does not offer medical or nursing care. But if medical care is
the principal reason for placement in a nursing home, the entire nursing home bill (above
the 7.5% "floor") is deductible without allocation. See Robinson, 51 T.C. 520 (1968),
aff'd without opinion (9th Cir. 1970). Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) sets the line of demarca-
tion between a nursing home placement with a primary motivation of obtaining medical
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ties, " the Tax Court held a portion of the entry fee to be deducti-
ble. 6 ' In Klappenbach, a taxpayer was denied a charitable deduction
for a donation made to a corporation which solicited "sponsorship
gifts" proportionate to the size of the unit, to build retirement
homes.'62 With regard to a CCRC, the IRS has permitted a deduc-
tion of 30% of the entry fee for a CCRC because the taxpayer proved
that 30% of the facility's budget was devoted to medical and nursing
care. 6 3 If the facility ceased to provide lifetime care and paid a rebate
to the 78-year-old taxpayer, the recipient would have to include that
portion of the rebate which generated a tax benefit.
Finally, section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code may have an in-
direct impact on the securities plan.I 64 This section exempts the pro-
ceeds from the sale of a home that is the principal residence of a
care, where all costs would be deductible (even costs that substitute for ordinary living
costs) and placement motivated by other considerations. In the latter case, only the med-
ical component of the nursing home bill is deductible.
See also Counts, 42 T.C. 755 (1964), in which a deduction was permitted for the
amount a taxpayer paid for his father's nursing home care, including the lump-sum
"maintenance" charge that was assessed over and above itemized charges for certain
medical services. The father's institutionalization was held to have a primary purpose of
securing medical care for his high blood pressure and gall bladder illness, while nursing
care was necessary for his extensive impairment in performing daily activities.
160. A life care community or CCRC is a hybrid between a retirement community,
offering suitable living accommodations for the active elderly, but no medical facilities,
and a medically-oriented nursing home. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
161. Estate of Smith, 79 T.C. 313 (1982) (allowing the portion allocable to days of care
provided in the community's nursing center without additional charge to be deductible).
162. The Tax Court's rationale was that Mr. Klappenbach was in fact paying his
mother's rent by paying the necessary sum, not making a real charitable contribution. See
52 T.C.M. (CCH) 437 (1986).
163. Rev. Rul. 75-302, 1975-2 C.B. 306.
164. With regard to the one time exclusion for the sale of a permanent residence by a
taxpayer over the age of 55, most elder law attorneys would advise clients to forgo this
election, and to remain in the family home or to "trade up" to a more expensive home
and take advantage of the I.R.C. § 1034 election. Under Medicaid law, the family home
is an exempt asset and purchase of even an expensive residence will not affect Medicaid
eligibility. Certain transfers of the family home can also be made without affecting eligi-
bility, including: transfers to a spouse, to a sibling who already has an equity interest, or
to a minor or disabled child.
Originally, IRC § 121 was drafted to cope with an ordinary home sale, not a situation
where the nursing home resident is forced to concede that he or she will never return
home, causing the home to lose its homestead status. In fact, as originally drafted, § 121
mandated that the property for which exclusion of gain was sought must have been the
taxpayer's principal residence for at least a total of three years out of the five years ending
with the sale or exchange of the property. Recently enacted, § 121(d)(9) permits the
exclusion to be taken by an individual, "physically or mentally incapable of self-care,"
who used the property as a principal residence during at least one of the five years prior to
the sale, on condition that the disability occurred during the five-year period, and that the
taxpayer spends the time not in the principal residence in a licensed facility suitable for
his or her condition.
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taxpayer over age 55. Although Medicaid is not bound by tax con-
cepts, the principal residence is also likely to be a "homestead" for
Medicaid purposes. 16 5 Once the home loses its homestead status, 166 it
becomes an ordinary, non-exempt asset and the Medicaid beneficiary
may be required to sell it in order to meet Medicaid's maximum asset
requirment. By making non-Medicaid funds available for private pay-
ment of nursing home costs, the securities plan would allow an elderly
person's decision to retain or sell the home to be premised on financial
and tax considerations, with no need to consider Medicaid implica-
tions. The cruel need to sell the former homestead would be averted.
A Private Letter Ruling 16 7 has deemed the use of Internal Revenue
Code Section 1034168 in connection with the purchase of a life care
contract. The IRS' rationale was that the taxpayer did not purchase
an equity interest in the community, only the right to live there.
Under this theory, senior citizens who use home sale proceeds to buy
consortium securities would almost certainly be deemed the benefit of
section 1034 treatment, because the security-holder does not have an
equity interest in the real property of the participating consortium
facilities.
Implementing the consortium's securities plan might necessitate
the seeking of a ruling, or even an amendment to the Code itself, to
the effect that nursing home care paid for by securities would receive
tax treatment on a parity with nursing home care privately paid in
cash. Parity with LTC insurance would not be necessary, because
care compensated by insurance is not deductible. Unless the Code is
amended, or a favorable ruling is obtained, this provision would not
be available to insulate a gift of nursing home securities made to a
person at risk of institutionalization, because the consideration for the
securities is paid to the consortium, not directly to the health care
provider. 169
B. The Antitrust Implications of the Proposed Consortium
Section I of the Sherman Act forbids all contracts and combina-
tions, in the form of a trust or otherwise, and conspiracies in restraint
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(p) (1989); 42 C.F.R. § 433.36.
166. See STRAUSS, WOLF & SHILLING, supra note 49, at 303-07.
167. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-37-022 (June 14, 1988).
168. I.R.C. § 1034 (1988) provides for nonrecognition of gain where a principal resi-
dence is sold and a more expensive residence is purchased.
169. A gift tax exclusion is available without regard to amount, for amounts paid di-
rectly to an educational institution or health care provider for the benefit of another. For
example, a grandparent may pay a child's private school tuition and a child may pay the
bill rendered by a parent's cardiologist. See IRC § 2503(eX2) (1991).
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of trade.' 70 This section considers whether the consortium would run
afoul of these prohibitions. Antitrust violations may potentially occur
whenever competitors engage in some form of concerted action that
has an effect on prices. 17' In such instances, attention must be paid to
the possibility of price fixing; 172 group boycott; attempted monopoly;
minimum or maximum price schedules;' 73 dividing the market; allo-
cating services; or attempting to prevent new entries into the mar-
ket.'74 The mere fact that an acquisition has been authorized by a
Certificate of Need statute will not insulate it from antitrust
scrutiny. ' 75
Indeed, the proposed consortium will impose a degree of price uni-
formity, because all holders of common stock would be entitled to a
month of care in return for each share "put" to the participating facil-
ity. However, the facilities would be free to set their private-pay
prices for non-shareholders at any level they choose. Similarly, they
would be able to key the redemption of zero-coupon bonds or annuity
payments to any private-pay price.
Furthermore, health facilities already agree to accept insurance re-
imbursement, which imposes a degree of uniformity to the extent that
the insurer has a payment schedule. In general, agreements between a
health care provider and an insurer to set the prices charged to pa-
tients have been held not to violate the antitrust laws. 176 By asserting
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1991).
171. Agreements to allocate markets by product, location, or customers are per se anti-
trust violations. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593, 597 (1951).
172. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. F.T.C., 94 F.T.C. 701, aff'd, 638 F.2d 443
(2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982), (affirming a consent order to stop a trade
association from price fixing and discouraging its members from advertising, despite the
truthful nature of the advertisements).
173. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (the agree-
ment between members of foundation for medical care to set maximum fees for care held
illegal per se under § I of the Sherman Act).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (holding that an owner
of a trademark agreement with licensed manufacturers to produce and sell under a terri-
torial allocation system per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act); United States v.
Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding agreements between owners/stockholders of
retail supermarkets not to stock brands other than their own brand products without
permission of other owners to constitute horizontal price-fixing because of territorial re-
strictions on competition).
175. North Carolina v. P.I.A. Asheville Inc., 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985). See also Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Cntr. v.
Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378 (1981) (federal health care planning legislation
does not have the effect of repealing the antitrust laws as they apply to health care
facilities).
176. See, e.g., Brillhart v. Mutual Medical Ins., 768 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1984) (agree-
ment between doctors and a doctor-managed insurer with respect to reimbursement
levels was not per se illegal); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984)
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that the consortium's activities are analogous to insurers such as Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, the consortium could withstand antitrust
challenge.
Further arguments to insulate the consortium from an antitrust
challenge might focus upon the indirectness of the consortium's effect
on the pricing of its securities. Any issuer of securities has only an
indirect effect on pricing in the secondary market. Once the consor-
tium makes an initial public offering, the price of LTC securities
would be determined by investors, not by the consortium. Therefore,
the consortium would play a minimal role in setting prices. Market
demand and the overall availability of nursing home services would be
much more influential on prices.
The Fourth Circuit recently held that separate corporations consti-
tuting a cooperative may be treated as parts of a single enterprise,
thus making a "conspiracy," which requires at least two actors, im-
possible. '" Another bulwark against private suits is the principle that
the antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition, not the other
competitors, 78 thus requiring a potential plaintiff to demonstrate an-
titrust injury in order to have standing to sue. 179 The question then
remains as to who would suffer antitrust injury from the activities of
the consortium. As long as the consortium is operated in good faith,
and makes membership open on a voluntary basis to all facilities that
meet objective standards of quality, no facility providing adequate
care would be denied membership. Furthermore, facilities that chose
not to join could not complain if the consortium offered its members
certain advantages. 0
Antitrust complications might also be avoided if consortium activi-
ties are treated as favorably as those of a "trade association."'' A
(prohibition of billing in excess of the insurer's reimbursement level is not a per se price
fixing violation); Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) (agreement by pharmacies to limit prescription
prices for insured individuals to a fixed amount did not constitute illegal horizontal price
fixing).
177. See City of Mount Pleasant v. Assoc. Elec. Co-Op, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988)
(The Robinson-Patman Act, like the Sherman Act, is designed to protect competition
and it should not reach activity that has no economic consequence).
178. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (injury must be
causally linked to an illegal presence in the market).
179. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
180. See North Carolina, 740 F.2d 274. These advantages might include: cost-sharing
by bulk orders of drugs, over-the-counter medications, and supplies; advertising by the
consortium; and access to loans for improvements to the facilities.
181. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479
(D.D.C. 1984) (analyzing a periodontology association' activities under the rule of rea-
son, because the practice of predicting membership on the full-time practice of peri-
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long history of "coalitions" in health care planning suggest useful gui-
dance for the consortium's operations. In describing the fundamental
characteristics of a health care planning coalition, 182 one commenta-
tor has noted that the crucial issue in assessing collaboration among
competing health care providers is whether the collaboration is "out-
put enhancing,"-whether it creates a new product or new way of
delivering services.'" 3 This determination clearly embraces the pro-
posed securities financing plan.
A genuinely new product would be one that: offers significant con-
trols on costs and utilization review; permits segmented marketing;
uses a new mode of delivery of services, such as satellite television
for health education; and attracts bidders by offering a simplified,
common, uniform system of administration.8 4
Furthermore, current trends in antitrust enforcement suggest an in-
tent to create an exception for health care networks. A past chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, advocated a policy of non-interfer-
ence with pro-competitive joint ventures.' 85 In 1987, the FTC pro-
posed a consent decree indicating the dimensions of a bona fide joint
venture in the health care area:
"integrated joint venture" means a joint arrangement to provide
prepaid health care services in which physicians who would other-
wise be competitors pool their capital to finance the venture by
themselves or together with others, and share substantial risk of
adverse financial results caused by unexpectedly high utilization
odontology was held to be acceptable, because there was no anti-competitive intent and
no unreasonable restraint of trade). ,
182. See Arthur F. Southwick, Antitrust Law: Applications to the Health Care Industry,
in THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 222 (1988).
183. See generally Clifford D. Stromberg, Health Care Provider Networks: Antitrust
Issues and Practical Suggestions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE
LAW 73, 73-113 (Phillip A. Proger et al. eds., 1990).
184. Id. at 75.
185. More specifically, health care professionals in a truly competitive market
should be able to do the following:
(1) Health care professionals should be able to offer, without unjustified re-
strictions, any service that they are licensed and qualified to provide;
(2) They should be able to join other providers in a group or clinical practice,
and participate in HMOs and PPOs, without having to endure burdensome gov-
ernment regulations or unlawful retaliation from competing providers; and
(3) Health professionals should be able to use truthful, non-deceptive advertis-
ing to inform patients and potential patients about their services, qualifications,
prices, and all other relevant aspects of their practice.
Daniel Oliver, The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in the Health Care Area, in




costs of health care services.'S6
The securities proposal seems even less vulnerable than the joint
venture described in the proposal, because the various health facilities
participating in the consortium would continue at all times to be com-
petitors, and would have to compete more vigorously than if the con-
sortium did not exist. Access to consortium funds will permit
participants to expand and upgrade operations and their marketing to
the public. The expansion itself would force facilities to compete on
the basis of quality for referrals and in the context of placement
choices. To cite the approving language of In the Matter of Brunswick
Corporation, '8 7
The joint venture is in some respects a "quasi-merger" where coop-
eration between formerly independent companies often acts to ben-
efit and sprout competition. The combined capital assets or know-
how of two companies may facilitate entry into new markets and
thereby enhance competition, or may create efficiencies or new
product capacity that would otherwise be difficult to achieve.' 88
Group purchasing to reduce costs is a technique with obvious prac-
tical advantage, but one that must be carefully scrutinized under the
Robinson-Patman Act.'89 This statute forbids sales "in commerce,"
(so that intrastate transactions are not regulated) by a seller of com-
modities that grants a discriminatory price to a buyer who knowingly
benefits by the price discrimination. Under this statute, volume dis-
counts corresponding to cost savings for the manufacturer are permis-
sible, as are differences in price granted in good faith to meet a
competitive price. Furthermore, a specific exemption applies to non-
profit institutions when they purchase supplies for their own use. 190
In addition to Robinson-Patman Act problems, a group purchasing
agreement is subject to challenge under Sherman Act section II as a
186. Proposed Consent Agreement with Preferred Physicians Inc.; Analysis to Aid
Public Comment, 52 Fed. Reg. 45,970 (1987) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 13) (pro-
posed Dec. 3, 1987).
187. 94 F.T.C. 1174 (1979), aff'd sub nom. Yamaha Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 657 F.2d
971 (8th Cir. 1981).
188. Id. at 1265.
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13b.21(a), amending Clayton Act § 2 (1988).
190. The Nonprofit Institutions Act provides: "Nothing in the [Robinson-Patman Act]
shall apply to purchases of supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities,
public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit."
15 U.S.C. § 13c (1988). See, e.g., Under De Modena v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 743
F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984) (exemption extended to an HMO, but not to a hospital oper-
ated by a government agency); Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150 (1983) (exemption not to be extended to whatever new ven-
ture the nonprofit hospital finds attractive); Southwick, supra note 182, at 240-42.
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monopoly or attempt to monopolize. 191 Guidelines for an acceptable
joint-purchase program can be found in a Michigan case involving a
group-purchase program developed by a for-profit corporation organ-
ized to render services to a group of not-for-profit hospitals.I92 The
corporation entered into an agreement with a company that was, at
that time, the largest supplier of hospital, medical and surgical sup-
plies in the United States.
The Sixth Circuit held that this arrangement did not demonstrate
an attempt to monopolize local single-product markets; instead, the
court determined that the national market for supplies must be ana-
lyzed.' 93 The court reasoned that within the national market, com-
petitive forces mandate the development of cost-effective mechanisms
for selling hospital supplies.
A 1982 Business Review Letter issued by the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice 94 sheds further light on problems that
might arise in the pricing process. The letter concerned the 160 non-
profit hospitals in Ohio that had centralized their purchasing by using
the services of eight local purchasing groups. The purchasing groups,
in turn, organized themselves into a consortium which compiled a
single list for ordering each supply for all 160 hospitals, and then sub-
mitted the list for competitive bidding. The consortium recom-
mended the low bidder to the individual hospitals, but the actual
purchasing was done by the local group or the individual hospital,
which retained the ultimate authority for making decisions. The Jus-
tice Department did not challenge the consortium arrangement, find-
ing that there was no unreasonable restraint of trade, and further that
the entire arrangement was a good-faith attempt to cut hospital costs
by buying in volume at the best possible price.
In addition, Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System,'9 5
the seminal Supreme Court opinion, affords additional assurance that
the consortium's operations would not violate antitrust prohibitions.
The case involved a challenge by a broadcasting organization to the
"blanket licenses," issued by ASCAP and BMI to regulate the use of
copyrighted musical compositions and to administer the collection
and distribution of copyright royalties.' 96
191. See White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir.
1983).
192. Id. at 498.
193. Id. at 500-04.
194. See Antitrust Division Won't Attack Hospital Group Purchasing Program, 42 AN-
TITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1070, at 1321 (July 24, 1982).
195. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
196. Under the blanket license, the licensee paid a fee to ASCAP or BMI for the privi-
[Vol. XIX
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The blanket license survived the challenge. The Supreme Court also
noted in the course of its opinion that ASCAP and BMI had been the
subject of "rather intensive antitrust scrutiny."' 197 Because the Copy-
right Act of 1976 actually refers to blanket licenses and other similar
practices, the court held that the blanket license was not a per se Sher-
man Act violation. 1
98
The BMI decision suggests that the consortium can operate in con-
sonance with the current interpretation of the antitrust laws, and fur-
thermore, that it would not be challenged because it would have pro-
competitive, rather than anti-competitive effects. Nor would there be
antitrust injury to potential plaintiffs. Centralized purchasing could
probably be carried out without violating the Robinson-Patman Act.
C. Certificate of Need Issues
The failure of the private sector to build nursing homes reflects
legal limitations, imposed by both federal and state laws, on the con-
struction of health facilities. These laws require advance permission
and make it unlikely that a builder would take the risk of constructing
a nursing home without first obtaining the necessary licensing. This
regulatory system has arisen because of the traditionally large role
that the public sector has taken in the financing, construction, and
operation of health facilities. Initially, Medicare reimbursement was
made on a "cost-plus" basis, giving health care providers an incentive
to incur higher costs in order to secure a higher level of
reimbursement.
Traditionally, the public sector paid for the bricks, mortar, and
CAT scanners and opted to limit the number and scope of facilities as
a cost-cutting approach. 99 Outright price controls were tried briefly,
lege of using any and all copyrighted compositions licensed by that organization. CBS
challenged the blanket licensing system as monopolistic; its fees as price-fixing and tying
arrangements; and its operations as a concerted refusal to deal with non-licensees. Broad-
cast Music v. Colunbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1.
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id. at 19. The court distinguished the contract from the simple horizontal ar-
rangements contemplated by the Sherman Act, and characterized it as a response to the
serious problem of collecting and monitoring performance royalties. Thus, it had a pur-
pose other than preventing competition. The case was remanded to the Second Circuit
for further analysis under the rule of reason.
199. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES-AD-
MISSION PRO13LEMS FOR MEDICAID RECIPIENTS AND ATrEMPTS TO SOLVE THEM,
GAO/HRD-90-135, at 2 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter GAO III]. Two ways that states can
control increased Medicaid nursing home spending are restricting the supply of nursing
home care. States can restrict the bed supply by limiting construction of nursing homes
or by limiting the number of beds the states will certify for Medicaid payments. Restrict-
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then removed in 1977.2" Responding to these controls, providers vol-
untarily reduced cost increases to avert the threat of further federal
price controls. During the 1970s, a number of states implemented
their own cost containment programs, often including a change in re-
imbursement methodology. Instead of being reimbursed for their
costs, hospitals received "prospective payments"-that is, the amount
to be paid was determined in advance, based on factors that were not
limited to the hospital's costs. 20 1
In the early 1980s, voluntary efforts at cost control proved unavail-
ing, and in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA), 20 2 Congress moved away from cost-based reimbursement
for Medicare hospital charges, and adopted an interim system that
later led to the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) system of prospec-
tive payment for hospitals under Medicare.
In 1974, Congress mandated that the states adopt another cost-cut-
ting approach. Until its repeal in 1986, the National Health Planning
and Resources Development Act of 1974,2o3 ordered states to adopt
Certificate of Need statutes or lose federal funding.2" This law fur-
ther required states to create health planning agencies responsible for
approving all proposals for capital investment over $150,000 by any
hospital or nursing home. The goal was to ensure that the facilities,
whether public, not-for-profit, or proprietary, met state and federal
quality standards.
ing the supply of beds, in turn, can create a situation in which demand for nursing home
care exceeds the supply of available beds.
200. Eg., the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 91 Pub. L. No. 379, 84 Stat 799 The
Act provided for its own expiration on April 30, 1974; its price controls were terminated
in 1974. See Margaret G. Farrell, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Regulation of Health
Care, in 1 BIOLAW 333, 364 (1986).
201. Id. at 367-370.
202. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982)
203. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300q et seq.)
(1991)
204. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-409 (Supp. 1991); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 15438.1 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 438 et seq.
(West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-155 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 381.701 et seq. (Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2 (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 111 1/2, para. 1151 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4801 (1986);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.061 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 301 et seq.
(1980 & Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111 § 25B (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-7-187-201 (1981 & Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 197.300 et seq. (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-1 et seq.
(West 1987 & Supp.1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1 et seq. (1985 & Supp.1991).
Many of the states have retained their CON laws even after repeal of the federal statute,




In particular, under the federal Certificate of Need statute, "only
those services, facilities and organizations found to be needed shall be
offered or developed in the State. ' 2°5  Criteria for the decision in-
cluded: a population's perceived need for the proposed services; the
availability of less costly or more efficient means of delivering the
same services; and the likely effect the proposed construction would
have on the applicant's cost of providing services.20 6
Compliance with the statute was accomplished in a two-step pro-
cess. First, local health service agencies performed an initial evalua-
tion of the applications using the criteria of the federal or state
statute. As a second step, state health planning agencies evaluated the
health service agency recommendations and made a final decision,
which could be reviewed administratively at the request of an appli-
cant whose request was denied.20 7
A further regulatory step could also be imposed by the Medicare
and Medicaid "Section 1122 Program." This program required state
agencies to advise the secretary of Health and Human Services
whether a proposed capital expenditure satisfied the "necessary and
appropriate" requirement as a condition for-the receipt of federal re-
imbursement. A negative evaluation from the state agency would
lead to denial of the requested federal funds.
As would be expected, the tension between state regulatory
schemes and the private sector has produced litigation. For example,
National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Cntr. v. Blue Cross of
205. See supra note 202.
206. See State of North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532
(E.D.N.C. 1977) (the court found the legislation to be a reasonable Congressional re-
sponse to the need to assure that federal grant money did not have the effect of increasing
medical costs).
Several cases hold that a statutory requirement that CON applicants show a need for
the proposed facility is proper as a valid exercise of the state's police power. See, e.g.,
People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 509, 206 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1984); Boswell, Inc. v. Harkins, 230 Kan. 738, 640 P.2d 1208 (1982), app. dismd.,
459 U.S. 802; New Jersey Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v. Finley, 83 N.J. 67, 415 A.2d
1147, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 944; Merry Heart Nursing & Cony. Home v. Dougherty, 131
N.J. Super. 412, 330 A.2d 370 (1974); Levine v. Whalen, 39 N.Y. 2d 510, 384 N.Y.S.2d
721, 349 N.E.2d 820 (1976); Attoma v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 26 A.D.2d 12, 270
N.Y.S.2d 167 (4th Dept. 1966) (such regulation is a valid exercise of police power even
when the facility or proposed facility being regulated is a private one that receives no
public funds); State v. Hudson Home for the Aged, 62 A.D.2d 1121, 405 N.Y.S.2d 319
(3d Dept. 1978). See also John P. Ludington, Annotation, Licensing and Regulation'of
Nursing or Rest Homes, 53 A.L.R. 4TH 689 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
Even a contrary result would have little practical impact: remember that about three-
quarters of nursing homes receive at least some Medicaid funds. See supra note 23.
207. See Farrell, supra note 200, at 365.
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Kansas City 20 8 demonstrates the interrelation between the CON sys-
tem and the antitrust laws. The CON statutes made no distinction
between proprietary and other facilities. Therefore, private facilities
that were in competition were forced to cooperate to a certain extent,
both by sharing information and by refraining from adding competi-
tive facilities whose construction was barred by the CON laws. Ironi-
cally, at the time the case arose, the domicile state, Missouri, had not
even enacted a CON statute. Missouri did have a health services
agency, which found that there was a surplus of hospital beds in the
Kansas City area, and subsequently refused to allow any institution to
add more acute-care beds. Blue Cross had also refused (as a cost-
control measure) to accept new hospitals as Blue Cross participants in
its program unless these applicants could show that there was a
clearly evident need for additional hospital beds in the service area.
The plaintiff hospital in National Gerimedical obtained a state li-
cense and opened its facility despite the lack of local planning ap-
proval. The conflict arose when the hospital's attempt to participate
in Blue Cross was denied because of this failure to procure ap-
proval. 20 9 The hospital responded to this denial by bringing an anti-
trust suit against Blue Cross, charging violations of Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. In its defense, Blue Cross unsuccessfully alleged
that the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
("NHPRDA") had implicitly repealed the antitrust laws in the con-
text of new health facility construction. 210 The Supreme Court re-
fused to accept this argument, however, finding that there was no
clear repugnancy or explicit repeal of the antitrust laws and the
NHPRDA.
Why then, did the NHPRDA fail? One theory is that the regula-
tors were unduly influenced by regulated industries, and despite their
inefficiency, allowed the existing facilities to stay in business, by keep-
ing new competitors out of the market. Additionally, the CON pro-
gram had failed to contain costs, stemming from a failure to impose a
ceiling on the total amount of new capital expenditures permitted in
any one state or region.2 1
208. 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
209. National Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 381.
210. Id. at 382.
211. Health planning, then, was not an exercise in allocating finite, scarce re-
sources; the pie to be divided by the agencies was limited only by the inclination
of the private sector to make investments in health care. Thus, there was no
conceptual reason why the local planning bodies could not approve every appli-
cation for a CON-indeed, there was even an incentive to do so, since disap-
provals might have produced lawsuits and eventual reversals. . . .[T]o the
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As is clear from National Gerimedical, the question of competition
is intimately related to the question of quality. The assertion of this
Article is that increasing the number of nursing homes, especially the
number of nursing homes in the proprietary sector, will increase com-
petition and force them to compete on the basis of quality. But this is
not necessarily true, especially since few nursing home placement de-
cisions are made after leisurely consideration by well-informed parties
and that factors other than quality have an important effect on choice
of a nursing home.
A provocative 1982 work212 illustrates how the CON regulatory
system, by keeping nursing home beds scarce, enables nursing homes
to select patients, rather than the converse:
Entry controls through certificate-of-need laws and the 1122 pro-
gram have made it nearly impossible in many communities for pa-
tients to choose a home suitable for their needs, since they are
frequently lucky to get any bed at all; indeed if this is not the case,
the certificate-of-need agency can be accused of not doing its job of
tightening supply to force rationing of beds.213
Under those circumstances, nursing homes, like airlines, engage in
"load management," seeking the most profitable way to fill a seat or a
bed. But there are plenty of discount airfares, but no discount nursing
home beds, because airlines have a lot more empty seats than nursing
homes have empty beds. The economics of nursing homes differ sig-
nificantly from those of hospitals, and Havinghurst suggests that com-
petition is both more beneficial and more feasible for nursing homes
than for hospitals.214
Havinghurst has also expressed concern 21 5 that increasing the sup-
ply of nursing home beds would simultaneously increase the demand
for such services ("induced demand" or "induced utilization"). The
problem of induced demand is most serious when public funds are
extent that regulation restricts the choices otherwise available in the market-
place it limits individual autonomy in favor of collective determinations of dis-
tributive justice. And, to the extent that competition determines whether a
proposal for private capital investment is ever placed before a planning body for
its approval, it significantly limits the effectiveness of the regulatory process in
achieving equitable distribution of health care resources. It might be that regu-
lation of investment and market competition for health services can coexist, but
that neither can be fully effective in achieving its objectives because of the other.
See Farrell, supra note 200, at 367.
212. CLARK HAVINGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLAN-
NING FOR COMPETITION 352-63 (1982).
213. Id. at 355.
214. Id. at 357.
215. Id. at 359-62.
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involved, least serious when consumers spend their own money for
long-term care. The intended effect of the proposed securities funding
plan is to induce the building of new facilities, with funds derived
from the issuance of the securities, and to induce consumers to spend
their own funds on securities with a view to eventual long-term care.
Efficiency and equity concerns should dictate the continued use of
utilization review,216 rather than artificially limiting the supply of
beds as a clumsy indirect form of utilization review. Induced demand
consists both of people who have always needed the service, which is
only now being made available, as well as those who do not need the
service. In any case, the fact remains that people are much more
likely to avoid nursing homes despite a real need than to manufacture
a need in order to gain admittance.
State CON laws may make it difficult for facility operators to use
funds from the proposed securities plan to make capital improve-
ments, or to build new facilities, and may make it particularly difficult
for entrepreneurs to enter the nursing home field. Full implementa-
tion of the securities program may require modification of some CON
laws to allow upgrading and increased bed capacity in the interest of
competition. If such modification cannot be obtained, it may limit the
attractiveness of the securities in those states.
V. Conclusion
The proposed securities plan will enable the private sector to as-
sume a significant role, both in the management of proprietary facili-
ties and in health care financing. In fact, the public and private
sectors have important and complementary roles to play in the provi-
sion and financing of long-term care for the elderly.
The benefits of the proposed plan are apparent. To a prospective
patient, the securities plan offers an opportunity to save and invest for
care needs, while maintaining a store of value that would be accessible
in the event that LTC is not required. Ordinarily, Medicaid planning
is complex, expensive, and requires that the recipient surrender con-
216. Utilization review, which is required in some form by the Medicare and Medicaid
programs as well as by private insurers, can take several forms. In order to be reim-
bursed, a patient may have to receive prior approval for non-emergency care. Medicare
Peer Review Organizations review the admissions and discharges of Medicare patients for
appropriateness. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a (1989); Lee P. Jedziniak,
Regulation of Utilization Reviews. One State's Approach, HEALTH INSURANCE UNDER-
WRITER 16 (Feb. 1991); Glenn Kramon, Medical Second-Guessing-In Advance, N.Y.
TIMES, February 24, 1991, at F12. See also Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-203 §§ 4091-4097, 101 Stat. 1330-268; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 4205, 104 Stat. 1388.
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trol over assets and accept a financially compromised lifestyle. For
example, a Medicaid plan may call for conversion of income-produc-
ing investments to non-productive forms. Under the securities plan,
security holders would have complete control over their investments
and complete discretion over their financial choices.
To state and federal governments, the proposed plan would shift a
great part of the burden of caring for the non-indigent away from the
taxpayer. More of the Medicaid budget could be allocated to help
those who cannot afford to buy insurance or invest in securities. Re-
ducing government involvement in the planning and administration
process offers the additional efficiencies inherent in a private-sector
solution. Similarly, to the proprietary LTC facilities, the proposed
plan would offer an immediate access to capital which could be used
to improve operations, expand bed capacity, and build new facilities
subject to the amendment of Certificate of Need laws.
This Article represents a preliminary step in the research process
designed to further the creation of more and better alternatives for
meeting the ever-increasing need for the growing elderly population.
Yet, several important questions remain unanswered. For example,
what types of services would be desired by LTC consumers and po-
tential consumers? Should the securities concept be expanded beyond
nursing home care to include home care and specialized housing for
the elderly? How should consortium facilities price their services and'
securities? While the economic impact of the securities plan on the
LTC market remains unclear, the underlying need to reduce govern-
ment health care expenditures and to individualize health care plan-
ning suggests that a securities plan could provide a viable solution.
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